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I. INTRODUCTION
The question when does a partnership exist has been described
as "the most tormented and heavily litigated area of partnership
law."' Partnerships can exist as a matter of law contrary to the
express intent of the people deemed to be partners. This is true
both for state law purposes and for federal income tax purposes.
For state law purposes, one basic consequence of being deemed a
partner is the imposition of unlimited personal liability to the con-
tract and tort creditors of a business.2 Another is that the Uniform
Partnership Act (U.P.A.) will be presumed to reflect the agreement
of the partners in the absence of a provable agreement to the con-
trary. For federal income tax purposes, a wide range of conse-
quences can flow from the finding that a partnership exists. Most
basically, the partnership provisions of the Internal Revenue Code
(Code), contained in Subchapter K, will be applied to the group
considered partners.3 The unanticipated application of these provi-
sions can have consequences that are extremely harsh. Properly
anticipated, the provisions of Subchapter K can offer a wealth of
tax savings. The purpose of this article is to explain when a part-
nership will be found to exist, both for state law purposes and for
federal income tax purposes. In particular, an attempt will be
made to explain some of the basic consequences that can flow from
a finding that a tax partnership exists. A discussion of limited
partnerships follows a discussion of general partnerships.
II. STATE LAW OF GENERAL PARTNERSHIP
A. Definition of Partnership: State Law
The U.P.A. broadly provides that a "partnership is an associa-
tion of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners a business for
profit."'4 The word "association" connotes that two or more persons
have come together voluntarily.' The term "person" includes "in-
dividuals, partnerships, corporations, and other associations.'
1. J. CRANE & A. BROMBERG, LAW OF PARTNERSHIP 32 (1968).
2. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP AcT § 15, 6 U.L.A. 174 (1969) [hereinafter cited as U.P.A.].
3. I.R.C. §§ 701-761 (1982).
4. U.P.A. § 6(1), 6 U.L.A. at 22.
5. CRANE & BROMBE G, supra note 1, at 38 n.37, points out that "association" is used
different ways in different contexts. The U.P.A. sense seems to be no more particularized
than a coming together. The word has a very different meaning in federal income tax law.
6. U.P.A. § 2, 6 U.L.A. at 12.
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Thus, a partnership can itself be a member of another partnership.
The requirement that the persons intend to carry on "as co-own-
ers" does not mean that there must be an identifiable asset.7
Rather, it indicates that there must be something more than a
principal-agent relationship: "To state that partners are co-owners
of a business is to state that they each have the power of ultimate
control." On the other hand, partnership has been found even
though one person has exclusive management rights.9 Similarly, a
partnership can exist even though one person has agreed to bear
all the losses. 10
Each partner is deemed to be an agent of the partnership for the
purpose of partnership business,
and the act of every partner, including the execution in the part-
nership name of any instrument, for apparently carrying on in the
usual way the business of the partnership... binds the partner-
ship, unless the partner so acting has in fact no authority to act
for the partnership in the particular matter, and the person with
whom he is dealing has knowledge of the fact that he has no such
authority."1
The purpose of this section is to "avoid any possible doubt as to
whether a partner has the authority, in the ordinary course of busi-
7. U.P.A. § 6, Official Comment, 6 U.L.A. at 23:
The words "to carry on as co-owners a business" remove any doubt in the fol-
lowing case: A and B sign partnership articles and make their agreed contributions
to the common fund. A refuses to carry on business as agreed. Is there a partner-
ship to be wound up in accordance with the provisions of Part VI "Dissolution
and Winding-up"? The words quoted require an affirmative answer to this ques-
tion. If the words "carrying on business" had been used, in the case given, no
partnership would exist, and Part VI would not apply.
On the other hand, at least one court refused to find partnership in the case of an isolated
transaction. Walker, Mosby & Colvert, Inc. v. Burgess, 151 S.E. 165 (Va. 1930).
8. U.P.A. § 6, Official Comment, 6 U.L.A. at 23.
9. For example, in Greenhouse v. Zempsky, 218 A.2d 533, 535 (Conn. 1966), against a
strong dissent, the court found that a two-person partnership existed even though one per-
son was the sole "boss." The non-boss was "not a general partner and therefore not a part-
ner in the usual sense," but was a partner nonetheless.
10. See, e.g., Stafford v. First Nat. Bank, 13 S.W.2d 21, 22 (Ark. 1929), which states:
In submitting the issue of whether funds on deposit were partnership money,
the court instructed the jury as follows. . . "A partnership is a collection of two
or more individuals who enter into a mutual agreement to conduct a joint venture
or enterprise and share in the profit and losses arising therefrom as may be agreed
upon." This instruction was an erroneous declaration of law, because it is not es-
sential to every partnership that each man share in the losses. By agreement it
may be otherwise.
11. U.P.A. § 9(1), 6 U.L.A. at 132.
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ness, to enter into formal contracts for his partnership, or to con-
vey partnership property when the conveyance is the result of a
sale in the ordinary course of partnership business."" On the other
hand, an act of a partner in contravention of a restriction on his
authority will not bind the partnership to anyone having knowl-
edge of the restriction." Nor will the partnership be bound by an
act "which is not apparently for the carrying on of the business of
the partnership in the usual way," unless the act was authorized by
the other partners." Nor may certain extraordinary steps be taken
unilaterally by an individual partner:
Unless authorized by the other partners or unless they have
abandoned the business, one or more but less than all the part-
ners have no authority to:
(a) Assign the partnership property in trust for creditors
or on the assignee's promise to pay the debts of the
partnership,
(b) Dispose of the good-will of the business,
(c) Do any other act which would make it impossible to
carry on the ordinary business of a partnership,
(d) Confess a judgment,
(e) Submit a partnership claim or liability to arbitration
or reference."
In short, the relationship of partnership under state law has long
been considered an intimate one of potentially great consequence.
Perhaps the most sobering consequence that should be considered
by someone contemplating a partnership is the exposure to unlim-
ited personal liability for the day-to-day business activities and
frailties of each of his partners. 6 Also to be considered is the fact
that the U.P.A. will be deemed to govern the partnership relation
unless a contrary partnership agreement can be proven. That the
U.P.A. defines the relationship as one of great consequence, inti-
macy and fiduciary duty is clear. For example, every partner must
account to the partnership as a fiduciary for any profits derived
without the consent of the other partners from any transaction
connected with the partnership business or from any use of part-
12. U.P.A. § 9, Official Comment, 6 U.L.A. at 133.
13. U.P.A. § 9(4), 6 U.L.A. at 133.
14. U.P.A. § 9(2), 6 U.L.A. at 132.
15. U.P.A. § 9(3), 6 U.L.A. at 132.
16. U.P.A. § 15, 6 U.L.A. at 174.
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nership property. 7 Thus it makes sense both that no one can be
made a partner without the consent of all the other partners, 8 and
that any partner can dissolve the partnership at will at any time,
notwithstanding any provision in the partnership agreement to the
contrary.19
B. Partners By Estoppel and the Role of Intent
The basic U.P.A. definition of partnership as "an association of
two or more persons to carry on as co-owners a business for
profit"20 is obviously susceptible to extremely broad interpretation.
That definition, however, cannot be read in isolation. It must be
read in conjunction with U.P.A. section 7, which states more spe-
cific rules for determining whether a partnership exists. On the one
hand, section 6 provides a very broad definition of what constitutes
a partnership. On the other hand, section 7 tells the courts that
not every relationship that falls within the literal definition of sec-
tion 6 should be considered one of partnership. Section 7 says that
courts should not always find partnership from the basic fact of
financial interdependence in a profit-making venture.2 Although
profit-sharing always suggests the question of partnership when
there is unincorporated business activity, it can be explained by
relationships other than partnership.
Section 16 of the U.P.A. concerns partners by estoppel. It rejects
the rule that a person is liable if he has been held out as a partner
and knows that he is being held out, unless he prevents such hold-
ing out, even if to do so he must take legal action. It adopts instead
the rule that to be liable as a partner, the person held out must
consent to the holding-out and that consent is a matter of fact.22
When someone has been represented to be a partner in an existing
partnership,
he is an agent of the persons consenting to such representation to
bind them to the same extent and in the same manner as though
he were a partner in fact, with respect to persons who rely upon
the representation. Where all the members of the existing part-
17. U.P.A. § 21(1), 6 U.L.A. at 258. See Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 468 (1928),
for Cardozo's famous statement that, for the managing co-adventurer and those like him,
"the rule of undivided loyalty is relentless and supreme."
18. U.P.A. § 18(g), 6 U.L.A. at 213.
19. U.P.A. § 31(2), 6 U.L.A. at 376.
20. U.P.A. § 6(1), 6 U.L.A. at 505.
21. U.P.A. § 7(2)-(4), 6 U.L.A. at 38.
22. U.P.A. § 16, Official Comment, 6 U.L.A. at 196.
[Vol. 11:1
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nership consent to the representation, a partnership act or obliga-
tion results, but in all other cases it is the joint act or obligation
of the person acting and the persons consenting to the
representation."8
Section 7(1) of the U.P.A. provides that "[e]xcept as provided by
section 16 (dealing with partners by estoppel) persons who are not
partners as to each other are not partners as to third persons."', It
might be thought that this means that, unless they are partners by
estoppel, people are not partners unless they intend to be. In one
sense, this is true. A partnership is an "association," which con-
notes two or more persons intentionally coming together. It has
frequently been said that intent is necessary to become a partner,
and that no one will become a partner merely by the act of some-
one else.2 5 In another sense, it is not true that people are not part-
ners unless they intend to be. It is not necessary that the parties
intend to be classified as partners. The question is whether they
intended to enter a relationship which is in essence a partnership,
however the relationship is described. Stated differently, whether a
partnership exists is a question of law. If the essense of a partner-
ship relationship is found, a partnership will be deemed to exist.
Martin v. Peyton s contains what is perhaps the classic statement
that entrepreneurs cannot avoid a finding of partnership merely by
stating that none exists:
Assuming some written contract between the parties, the ques-
tion may arise whether it creates a partnership. If it be complete,
if it expresses in good faith the full understanding and obligation
of the parties, then it is for the court to say whether a partner-
ship exists. It may, however, be a mere sham intended to hide the
real relationship. Then other results follow. In passing upon it,
effect is to be given to each provision. Mere words will not blind
us to realities. Statements that no partnership is intended are
23. U.P.A. § 16(2), 6 U.L.A. at 195-96.
24. U.P.A. § 7(1), 6 U.L.A. at 38. See C"ANE & BROMBERO, supra note 1, at 37:
Many jurisdictions formerly recognized the doctrine of "partnership as to third
persons" for imposing liability on persons associated with a business, e.g., where
the courts were convinced that persons sharing profits ought to share losses even
though not co-proprietors. The U.P.A. abolishes the doctrine, save in cases of es-
toppel from holding out, by providing that "persons who are not partners as to
each other are not partners as to third persons." This is an attempt to apply a
uniform test, whether the dispute is among the alleged partners or with an out-
sider (footnotes omitted).
25. CRANE & BROMBERG, supra note 1, § at 39.
26. 158 N.E. 77 (N.Y. 1927).
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not conclusive. If as a whole a contract contemplates an associa-
tion of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners a business
for profit, a partnership there is. Section [6(1)]. On the other
hand, if it be less than this, no partnership exists. Passing on the
contract as a whole, an arrangement for sharing profits is to be
considered. It is to be given its due weight. But it is to be weighed
in connection with all the rest. It is not decisive. It may be merely
the method adopted to pay a debt or wages, as interest on a loan
or for other reasons.
Conversely, statements that a partnership does exist, although per-
suasive, are not necessarily conclusive.28 The question that remains
is how courts determine when a partnership exists as opposed to
some other legal relationship. Courts are guided in this task by sec-
tion 7 of the U.P.A., which among other things provides that not
all profit-sharers are prima facie partners.
C. The Co-Ownership Element
Partners are people who "carry on as co-owners a business for
profit." 9 It is co-ownership of a business that is essential rather
than co-ownership of a particular asset. Thus, an asset that is nec-
essary to the partnership business may simply be loaned to the
partnership by one of the partners and never become partnership
property.30 On the other hand, there is no automatic finding of
partnership from the mere fact that there is a financial asset that
is co-owned. 1 The U.P.A. provides: "Joint tenancy, tenancy in
common, tenancy by the entireties, joint property, common prop-
erty, or part ownership does not of itself establish a partnership,
whether such co-owners do or do not share any profits made by the
use of the property. 3 2 Co-ownership will not rise to the level of
partnership unless it involves a sufficient degree of activity to con-
27. Id. at 78. See also Associated Piping and Engineering Co. v. Jones, 61 P.2d 536 (Cal.
Dist. Ct. App. 1936).
28. See, e.g., In re Williams, 297 F. 696 (1st Cir. 1924); Rosenblum v. Springfield Pro-
duce Brokerage Co., 137 N.E. 357 (Mass. 1922); Hamilton v. Boyce, 48 N.W.2d 172 (Minn.
1951).
29. U.P.A. § 6(1), 6 U.L.A. at 22.
30. See I.R.C. § 707(a) (1982) and Long v. United States, 76-2 U.S.T.C. 9669 (W.D.
Tex. 1976), in which a partner was found to have loaned an apartment complex to his part-
nership. U.P.A. § 8(2), 6 U.L.A. at 115, provides that "[uinless the contrary intention ap-
pears, property acquired with partnership funds is partnership property."
31. This is true also for federal income tax purposes. See section III C of this article for
a further discussion.
32. U.P.A. § 7(2), 6 U.L.A. at 38-9.
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stitute a business.3 3 How much more there must be beyond "mere
co-ownership" before co-tenants will be deemed partners is a ques-
tion of continuing uncertainty and importance, both for state law
purposes34 and for federal income tax purposes.3 5
If the requisite level of business activity is present, the question
is whether it is being carried on by the parties "as co-owners." Co-
ownership, also referred to as "community of interest," has been
said to be the most important element of partnership and consists
of several components: capital or property sharing; loss sharing;
profit sharing and control sharing. Of these, profit sharing and con-
trol sharing are the most important. It has been noted that capital
or property sharing is not necessary to partnership s6 and it is clear
that partners may agree among themselves whether and how to
share losses.37 Profit sharing is at the essence of partnership and is
prima facie evidence of partnership unless one of several special
relationships is present.38 Profit sharing is also a relatively easily
identifiable factor, much more so than control sharing.
The U.P.A. Official Comment is very brief with respect to the co-
ownership element and its important control component:
The definition asserts that the associates are "co-owners" of the
business. This distinguishes a partnership from an agency - an
association of principal and agent. A business is a series of acts
directed toward an end. Ownership involves the power of ultimate
control. To state that partners are co-owners of a business is to
state that they each have the power of ultimate control.3 9
Once someone is established as a partner, he has the power to bind
the partnership to third persons unless they know of a restriction
on his authority.40 The question is when is a person's authority so
restricted or delegated that he should not be considered a partner?
33. Compare section V of this article concerning the opportunity for certain relatively
passive unincorporated organizations to elect to be excluded from some or all of the rules of
Subchapter K.
34. See CRANE & BROMBERO, supra note 1, at 59-63.
35. See infra section III C.
36. But see the discussion of I.R.C. § 704(e)(1) (1982) at section III B infra; United
States v. Frazell, 335 F.2d 487 (5th Cir. 1964).
37. "[S]ubject to any agreement between them ... [ejach partner ... must contribute
to the losses, whether of capital or otherwise, sustained by the partnership according to his
share in the profits." U.P.A. § 18(a), 6 U.L.A. at 213.
38. See infra section I D.
39. U.P.A. § 6, Official Comment, 6 U.L.A. at 23.
40. U.P.A. § 9(4), 6 U.L.A. at 133. See generally infra section II A.
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The question is , a difficult one because partnership agreements
often entail significant restrictions on the authority of one or more
of the partners. It is often unrealistic to assume that "each [has]
the power of ultimate control" if that term refers to the agreement
or practice of the partners. The U.P.A. itself anticipates that part-
ners may agree that management will not be shared equally.4 ' In
large law firms, for example, important policy decisions are often
concentrated in a relatively small group, often called an executive
committee.
Despite the difficulty, several generalizations may be ventured. If
the parties intend to be partners and call themselves partners, it
probably matters little that management has been concentrated in
the hands of one or a few. 42 On the other hand, other profit-shar-
ers, such as lenders, can be vested with a great deal of control
without being rendered partners if they carefully document their
relationship as something other than partnership.43 The control,
however, must be consistent with the alternative relation asserted.
For example, it is not uncommon for a creditor to assert consulta-
tion rights or even veto power concerning certain types of transac-
tions. It is more suggestive of partnership, however, if affirmative
control is exercised. Examples of affirmative control include select-
ing investments and directing pricing policies. It is sufficient that
there is a right to control; an actual exercise of that right is not
necessary.44
At some point, the lack of control raises the question whether
the interest acquired, particularly if it is acquired for cash rather
than services, is a "security." The basic definition of a security,
both for federal and state securities law purposes, is an investment
of money in a common enterprise with the expectation of profit
solely or primarily through the efforts of a promoter or a third
party.4 Because limited partners are passive investors who are not
to take part in the control of the business," limited partnership
41. U.P.A. § 18, 6 U.L.A. at 213 provides that, "subject to any agreement between them
[a]ll partners have equal rights in the management and conduct of the partnership
business."
42. See, e.g., Bernstein, Bernstein, Wile & Gordon v. Ross, 177 N.W.2d 193, 195 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1970), which held that a person was a partner, and not merely an employee, even
though he "agreed to relinquish all management to the senior partners."
43. See, e.g., Martin, 158 N.E. 77.
44. See, e.g., Bengston v. Shain, 255 P.2d 892, 896 (Wash. 1953).
45. See, e.g., United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 852 (1975); SEC v.
Howey, 328 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1946).
46. See infra section VI.
[Vol. II:I
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interests are most commonly treated as securities, both for federal
and state securities law purposes.47 On the other hand, some have
assumed incorrectly that interests in general partnerships cannot
constitute securities. There is no reason to suppose that an interest
in a general partnership can never fall within the rather sweeping
definition of security. Perhaps the most pointed example of this is
the Empire State Building, which was the subject of a publicly
syndicated offering of units of participation in general partnership
interests. The prospectus in that syndication described the inves-
tors as "joint venturers" and reflected an opinion of counsel that
they would qualify as partners for federal income tax purposes.4 8 It
does seem clear that at some point, the absence of control of a
joint venturer or partner can at least raise a serious question
whether he has purchased a security."9
D. Share of Gross versus Profits; Nonpartner Profit Shares
Section 7 of the U.P.A. makes clear that the sharing of gross
receipts is a lesser indication of partnership than the sharing of net
receipts." The sharing of gross receipts "does not of itself establish
a partnership, whether or not the persons sharing them have a
joint or common right or interest in any property from which the
returns are derived."' 51 One who shares in the gross receipts of a
business is less dependent on the overall success of the business
47. See, e.g., Preparation of Registration Statements Relating to Interests in Real Estate
Limited Partnerships, SEC Release No. 33-6405, 1 FED. SEC. L. REP. 3829 (June 3, 1982).
48. Empire State Building Associates Prospectus, Oct. 31, 1961, reprinted in S. RoULAC,
SYNDICATION LANDMARKS 105, 117 (1974).
49. Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 424 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981)
(footnote omitted):
A general partnership or joint venture interest can be designated a security if the
investor can establish, for example, that (1) an agreement among the parties
leaves so little power in the hands of the partner or venturer that the arrangement
in fact distributes power as would a limited partnership; or (2) the partner or
venturer is so inexperienced and unknowledgeable in business affairs that he is
incapable of intelligently exercising his partnership or venture powers; or (3) the
partner or venturer is so dependent on some unique entrepreneurial or managerial
ability of the promoter or manager that he cannot replace the manager of the
enterprise or otherwise exercise meaningful partnership or venture powers.
Compare Marine Bank v. Weaver, - U.S. -, 102 S. Ct. 1220 (1982).
50. The distinction between a share of gross receipts and a share in profits can be impor-
tant for several tax purposes. Not only can it influence whether a partnership will be found
to exist for federal income tax purposes, but also may influence whether a particular amount
qualifies as a "guaranteed payment." See I.R.C. §§ 707(c), 736(a) (1982). But see Pratt v.
Commissioner, 64 T.C. 203 (1975), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 550 F.2d 1023 (5th Cir. 1977).
51. U.P.A. § 7(3), 6 U.L.A. at 39.
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than one who shares only if there are profits. One who shares in
the gross receipts can profit even though everyone else is breaking
even or losing money because total expenditures equal or exceed
total gross receipts. Because sharing of profits is at the heart of
partnership, it is easy to understand the notion that someone who
only profits if his associates profit is more like a partner than
someone who profits as his associates are losing money. Accord-
ingly, the general rule under the U.P.A. is that profit sharing, but
not the sharing of gross receipts, is prima facie evidence of
partnership.2
The general rule that profit sharing is prima facie evidence of
partnership is qualified by a short list of situations in which profit
sharing is not prima facie evidence of partnership. Two situations
that must be distinguished are those in which the profits are re-
ceived in payment "[a]s a debt by installments or otherwise," 3 and
those in which profits are received "as interest on a loan, though
the amount of payment vary with the profits of the business."" In
the first of these two situations, there is profit sharing in payment
of principal on a debt (or in payment of both principal and inter-
est), whereas in the second situation there is profit sharing only
insofar as the payment of interest is concerned. The first of these
two exceptions
appears to be a codification of a common law rule developed to
protect holders of previously created debt who tried to salvage
what they could from a failing debtor by taking some or all of his
profits. Ordinarily, of course, a creditor is entitled to be paid re-
gardless of profits, but enforcement of this right may sink a weak-
ened business and produce a total loss. Creditors are therefore
sometimes willing to keep a business afloat, usually under their
guidance, in a sort of informal receivership or reorganization. The
salvage effort is often unsuccessful, further liabilities accumulate,
and the question is whether the creditors are themselves liable as
partners to those who extended credit while they were sharing
profits.55
Whatever its origins, this first exception is not limited to pre-ex-
isting debt or salvage cases. It includes financings, refinancings, or
52. U.P.A. § 7(4), 6 U.L.A. at 39.
53. U.P.A. § 7(4)(a), 6 U.L.A. at 39.
54. U.P.A. § 7(4)(d), 6 U.L.A. at 39.
55. CANE & BROMBERG, supra note 1, at 80-81. The authors cite Cox v. Hickman, 11
Eng. Rep. 431 (1860) as the leading case.
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sales on credit in which payment to the creditor is from the outset
keyed to profits.56 However, if the terms of the alleged extension of
credit are functionally indistinguishable from a capital contribu-
tion, partnership status can result.57 The second type of situation,
in which there is a fixed obligation to repay principal coupled with
a promise to pay a portion of profits in lieu of or in addition to a
fixed rate of interest, is perhaps typified by the lender who seeks to
fall within an "interest contingency" exception to a usury law and
at the same time avoid partnership status.58 In general, the inves-
tor who is promised a return of his investment and is to receive a
share of profits in lieu of or in addition to interest will not be
deemed a partner unless he takes part in the control of the
business.5 9
The U.P.A. lists several additional situations in which the re-
ceipt of a share of profits is not prima facie evidence of partner-
ship. One is when profits are received as "wages of an employee."60
"Employee" in this context presumably is broader in scope than its
common law meaning, and apparently includes independent con-
tractors and others who provide services for profit.6 1 Because the
money partner and the service partner are a classic combination,
the absence of a capital contribution by the service partner may be
of little or no significance. Intent to become partners and the de-
gree to which control is shared are both important factors, al-
though it is possible to find someone a partner even though he has
little or no control over the business. However, an agreement to
share losses seems so alien to the normal employment relation that
56. See, e.g., Meisinger v. Johnson, 76 N.W.2d 267, 271 (Neb. 1956).
57. See, e.g., Davis v. Gilmore, 244 S.W.2d 671 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951). A "loan" to a
partnership can also be recharacterized as a contribution to capital for federal income tax
purposes. See, e.g., Hambuechen v. Commissioner, 43 T.C. 90 (1964) and Rev. Rul. 72-135,
1972-1 C.B. 200. It is possible for federal income tax purposes to be both a partner and a
creditor. See I.R.C. § 707(a), (c) (1982).
58. In general, if the loan terms are such that the lender could wind up with a return
significantly less than the maximum that would be permitted under a fixed rate of interest,
for example, in the event the borrower makes no profit, it will not be usurious if the lender's
actual return turns out to be much greater than the fixed rate maximum. See, e.g., Thomas-
sen v. Carr, 58 Cal. Rptr. 297, 300-02 (1967).
59. Such an investor is similar to a limited partner who has been promised a return of
his contribution. Martin is a classic case in which a lender for profits in lieu of interest had
a great deal of control over the business yet withstood a challenge that he was a partner. 158
N.E. at 77.
60. U.P.A. § 7(4)(b), 6 U.L.A. at 39.
61. See generally Annot., 137 A.L.R. 6 (1942) (partnership as distinguished from em-
ployment). For federal income tax purposes, a person may act both as a member of a part-
nership and as its employee. See I.R.C. § 707(a), (c) (1982).
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its presence would presumably be a strong indication of partner-
ship. Similarly, profit sharing is not prima facie evidence of part-
nership if the profits are received as "rent to a landlord." 2 Once
again, intent of the parties and control of the business are impor-
tant. As in the case of the lender, the landlord may exercise some
considerable control, particularly inspection or veto power, without
becoming a partner. As in the case of wages, an agreement to share
losses seems so peculiar to the usual landlord-tenant relationship
that it strongly suggests partnership.63 And, as is generally true,
rent based on gross receipts is a lesser indication of partnership
than rent based on profits."e
Only two additional statutory exceptions to profit-sharing as
prima facie evidence of partnership remain to be considered. The
first is when the profits are received as "an annuity to a widow or
representative of a deceased partner." 6 The partner who is selfish
enough to live, retire and receive the payments himself is probably
governed by the final and much broader exception, the situation in
which the profits are received as "the consideration for the sale of
a good-will of a business or other property by installments or oth-
erwise. '"66 As was the case with the other protected categories, the
caveat must again be raised that the seller receiving profits as his
sales proceeds can be deemed a partner if that was the intent or if
he takes part in control.
E. Consequence of Partnership: The Tenancy in Partnership
Both for state law purposes and for federal income tax purposes,
62. See generally Annot., 131 A.L.R. 508 (1941) (lease or tenancy agreement as creating
partnership relationship between lessor and lessee). For federal income tax purposes, a per-
son may act both as a member of a partnership and as its landlord. See I.R.C. § 707(a)
(1982).
63. See, e.g., Nelson v. Seaboard Sur. Co., 269 F.2d 882 (8th Cir. 1959).
64. CRANE & BROMBERG, supra note 1, at 90:
The principle holds in farming cases where the landowner receives a share of the
crop. However, if he bears any of the expenses of planting, cultivating and har-
vesting, he is actually sharing not the gross but something approximating the net
profits of the operation. This makes him a bit more susceptible to partnership
liability, but he is normally not vulnerable unless he participates in control, say,
by designating crops or markets. In the latter situation, he may be able to show
that the farmer was his employee or servant, thus avoiding partnership but incur-
ring vicarious liability for the farmer's actions in the scope of employment.
65. U.P.A. § 7(4)(c), 6 U.L.A. at 39.
66. U.P.A. § 7(4)(e), 6 U.L.A. at 39. For federal income tax purposes, there is great flex-
ibility to characterize the payments made to a withdrawing partner or his successor. See
I.R.C. §§ 741, 736 (1982).
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it is important to ask whether a particular question will be an-
swered in accordance with an "entity" theory of partnership or in
accordance with an "aggregate" theory of partnership. A certain
amount of tax law confusion in this area is understandable, be-
cause it has been preceded by well over a century of state law con-
fusion." Is there a separate entity, a partnership, that is inter-
posed between partner and partnership affairs, which separate
entity, like a corporation, has its own relationships with its assets,
its members, and the outside world, the results of which are simply
divided by the partners as residual owners, like shareholders? Or is
a partnership simply a collection of individuals, some of whom
play a very distinct part in certain dealings with assets, fellow
members, and the outside world, and who should be treated ac-
cordingly? The answer today, both for state law purposes and fed-
eral income tax purposes, is the same as it always has been and
probably always will be: whether an entity approach or an aggre-
gate or conduit approach will be applied depends upon the situa-
tion. This is as it should be. Only those with a perverse sense of
and passion for consistency could hope otherwise. Courts in Eng-
land never could decide. 8 The English mercantile courts said that
of course partnerships are entities, that is how they are treated
throughout the world of commerce. The English common law
courts, on the other hand, saw only aggregations of individuals,
and felt powerless to create a new business entity with a separate
legal personality. 9 Building upon this tradition of disagreement,
the U.P.A. was finalized as a compromise among people who were
divided in their support for these two different theories. Although
the U.P.A. does not expressly adopt the separate entity theory or
reject the aggregate theory, entity notions predominate."
Both for state law purposes and federal income tax purposes, the
application of the entity theory can have staggering consequences
that may be not only unanticipated, but also counterintuitive. Per-
haps one of the most overlooked fundamentals of partnership law
is that the U.P.A. provides that partnership property is held by the
partners in a special form of co-ownership designated tenancy in
partnership: "A partner is co-owner with his partners of specific
partnership property holding as a tenant in partnership." 7' As the
67. CRANE & BROMBERG, supra note 1, at 16-30.
68. Id. at 18-20.
69. See generally 35 Halsbury's Law of England (4th ed. 1981) (partnerships).
70. See CRANE & BROMBERG, supra note 1, at 16-29.
71. U.P.A. § 25(1), 6 U.L.A. at 326.
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incidents of the tenancy in partnership are unfolded, it becomes
clear that the partnership is treated as an independent, almost
tangible entity, that stands firmly between its assets and the part-
ners. In a very real sense, the effect of the tenancy in partnership
is to cut off the individual partner from partnership assets:
(2) The incidents of this tenancy are such that:
(a) A partner, subject to the provisions of this act and to
any agreement between the partners, has an equal right with
his partners to possess specific partnership property for
partnership purposes; but he has no right to possess such
property for any other purpose without the consent of his
partners.
(b) A partner's right in specific partnership property is
not assignable except in connection with the assignment of
rights of all the partners in the same property.
(c) A partner's right in specific partnership property is
not subject to attachment or execution, except on a claim
against the partnership. When partnership property is at-
tached for a partnership debt the partners, or any of them,
or the representatives of a deceased partner, cannot claim
any right under the homestead or exemption laws.
(d) On the death of a partner his right in specific part-
nership property vests in the surviving partner or partners,
except where the deceased was the last surviving partner,
when his right in such property vests in his legal representa-
tive. Such surviving partner or partners, or the legal repre-
sentative of the last surviving partner, has no right to pos-
sess the partnership property for any but a partnership
purpose.
(e) A partner's right in specific partnership property is
not subject to dower, curtesy, or allowances to widows, heirs,
or next of kin.71
Indeed, the interest of the partners is not in the partnership assets,
but in the partnership entity: "A partner's interest in the partner-
ship is his share of the profits and surplus, and the same is per-
sonal property."73 Just as the property interest of shareholders is
viewed as being in their shares, which are their contracts of
residual ownership, a partnership interest isseen as a separate as-
set and one that is personal property. 4
72. U.P.A. § 25(2), 6 U.L.A. at 326.
73. U.P.A. § 26, 6 U.L.A. at 349.
74. Similarly, for federal income tax purposes, a partner's interest in his partnership is
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Consider one possible consequence of the unanticipated applica-
tion of the rule that the partnership is a separate entity that cuts
off partners from partnership assets. Consider, for example, a
three-person partnership that owns investment real estate. One of
its members might draft a will that devises all his real property to
his family and all his personal property to his alma mater. He
might assume that he and his partners directly owned undivided
interests in real property. He might regard it as a sad comment on
the law that the partnership of which he is so proud is seen as a
separate entity that actually cuts him off from the interest in the
real property he thought he had, leaving him with only an interest
in personal property, a slice of an invisible intangible. 5
The drafters of the U.P.A. had several important objectives to be
served by this definition of the tenancy in partnership. The first
was a general goal to simplify the law, which also is frequently the
goal when an entity model is adopted for federal income tax pur-
poses.7' The second was to incorporate selected features of the law
of joint tenancy into the law of partnership. For example, when a
joint tenant dies, his interest in the property passes to the other
joint tenants. This is known as the "right of survivorship" of the
other joint tenants. The drafters of the U.P.A. felt that "[t]he inci-
dent of survivorship fits in with the necessities of partnership. On
the death of a partner, the other partners and not the executors of
the deceased partner should have a right to wind up partnership
affairs. '77 The third goal was to lay the foundation for a simplified
procedure in those cases in which the separate creditor of one part-
ner wishes to secure satisfaction out of his debtor's interest in the
partnership. The basic policy judgment was that particular pieces
of partnership property, and, hence, potentially, the very business
of the partnership, should not be jeopardized by every claim of
separate creditors. No partner has any interest in specific partner-
ship assets for his own personal purposes, he can convey no such
interest for personal purposes, nor can his personal creditors force
such a conveyance. Rather, his interest in the partnership is his
share of the profits and surplus, and it is against that interest that
his separate creditors may seek a charging order.78
generally treated as a separate, capital asset. I.R.C. § 741 (1982).
75. The federal income tax consequences of an inadvertent tax partnership can be
equally counterintuitive. See infra. section IV A-E.
76. Compare I.R.C. § 707(a), (c) (1982).
77. U.P.A. § 25, Official Comment, 6 U.L.A. at 327.
78. U.P.A. § 28, 6 U.L.A. at 358. See also Commissioner v. Lehman, 165 F.2d 383, 385
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III. PARTNERSHIPS FOR TAX PURPOSES
A. Definition of Partnership: Tax Law
For a variety of state law purposes, individuals may be deemed
to be partners independent of and contrary to their intent concern-
ing partnership classification, often with unanticipated conse-
quences. So, too, for federal income tax purposes, people may be
deemed partners against their will and to their great displeasure.
As under state law, intent to be classified as partners is evidence of
partnership, but the ultimate "intent" question is not the parties'
thoughts concerning how they are classified; the ultimate question
is whether they intended to enter a relationship, however denomi-
nated, the essence of which is tax partnership. 79 It should be em-
phasized that people can be deemed to be partners for tax pur-
poses even though their relationship is not one of partnership
under state law. Tax classification is determined under the Code
and is ultimately independent of state law classification. 0
The inadvertent tax partnership continues as a trap for the un-
wary because the tax definition of partnership is extremely broad.
The term "partnership" is defined to include any "syndicate,
group, pool, joint venture or other unincorporated organization
through or by means of which any business, financial operation, or
venture is carried on, and which is not, within the meaning of this
(2d Cir.), cert denied, 334 U.S. 819 (1948):
The practical effect of these interpolations into the common law was to impound
firm assets and deprive the individual partners of any control over them except in
so far as they were dealing with them on behalf of the firm as a unit. The individ-
ual partner's beneficial interests as a legal joint owner were trimmed down so that
he had nothing left save that the firm assets should be devoted to the firm busi-
ness, that he should share in any profits they produced and in the surplus upon
winding up, whether voluntary or by legal process.
79. On the matter of intent, in Commissioner v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733 (1949), the
Supreme Court said all facts must be considered:
The question is . . .whether, considering all the facts-the agreement, the con-
duct of the parties in execution of its provisions, their statements, the testimony
of disinterested persons, the relationship of the parties, their respective abilities
and capital contributions, the actual control of income and the purposes for which
it is used, and any other facts throwing light on their true intent-the parties in
good faith and acting with a business purpose intended to join together in the
present conduct of the enterprise.
Id. at 742 (footnote omitted). For a much more recent case in which the parties were held to
be tax partners even though neither they nor their government regulators considered them
partners, see Madison Gas and Electric Co. v. Commissioner, 633 F.2d 512 (7th Cir. 1980),
aff'g, 72 T.C. 521 (1979).
80. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1(c) (1977).
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title, a corporation or a trust or estate." 1
Thus, the Code defines partnership in the negative, and that is
why the category of partnership is potentially enormous. Partner-
ship is a residual category. If any unincorporated business group is
nothing else for tax purposes (a corporation or trust or estate), it is
a partnership. And a "partner" is defined to include any member
of the group.82 The "term 'partnership' is broader in scope than
the common law meaning of partnership, and may include groups
not commonly called partnerships."83 Perhaps the most extreme
example of this breadth of scope of the category of partnership for
federal income tax purposes is presented by certain limited part-
nerships that fall outside the present regulatory definition of a cor-
poration.84 Despite repeated statements in the Official Comment to
the Uniform Limited Partnership Act (U.L.P.A.) that a limited
partner is "not in any sense a partner,"85 limited partners are rou-
tinely held to be partners for tax purposes, even if their sole gen-
eral partner is a corporation. 6
B. Assignee of a Capital Interest
The Latin term delectus personae, meaning choice of the per-
son, has long been used to refer to the state law rule that each of
the parties involved must intend to enter into a partnership rela-
tionship. 7 This notion is embodied in the U.P.A.'s rule that one
cannot "become a member of a partnership without the consent of
all the partners."88
Delectus personae operates mainly to keep out of an existing
partnership someone who receives an interest in a partnership by
assignment or inheritance. However, the necessary consent of the
81. I.R.C. § 761(a) (1982), which is applicable for income tax purposes only. See also
I.R.C. § 7701(a)(2) (1982), which is a virtually identical definition. The § 7701(a)(2) defini-
tion applies to all of Title 26, which includes subtitles relating to income tax, estate and gift
tax, employment tax, procedure and administration.
82. I.R.C. § 761(b) (1982): "(b) Partner.-For purposes of this subtitle, the term 'part-
ner' means a member of a partnership." See also Tress. Reg. § 1.761-1(b) (1972); I.R.C. §
7701(a)(2) (1982).
83. Treas. Reg. § 1.761-1(a) (1972).
84. See infra section VII.
85. Uniform Limited Partnership Act § 1, Official Comment, 6 U.L.A. 564-65 (1969)
[hereinafter U.L.P.A.].
86. Larson v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 159 (1976), acq. 1979-2 C.B. 2. See infra section VII
A-L.
87. For the requisite nature of this intent, see infra section II B.
88. U.P.A. § 18(g), 6 U.L.A. at 213.
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other persons may be given or waived by conduct. Or they may
give it in advance by their agreement, say by providing for freely
transferable interests. Or they may delegate to some of their
number (say a managing partner) the authority to consent for
all.89
Even though an assignee does not become a partner without the
consent of the other partners, a partner's interest in a firm is as-
signable.9 0 The assignment of a partner's interest does not of itself
cause a dissolution of the firm or entitle the assignee to participate
in management, but it does entitle him "to receive in accordance
with his contract the profits to which the assigning partner would
otherwise be entitled."9
An assignee of a partnership interest can become a partner for
tax purposes even though he does not become a partner under
state law. The so-called "family partnership" rules contain a sup-
plemental definition of "partner" in section 704(e)(1), which has
been held to be generally applicable outside the area of family
partnerships: "A person shall be recognized as a partner for pur-
poses of this subtitle if he owns a capital interest in a partnership
in which capital is a material income-producing factor, whether or
not such interest was derived by purchase or gift from any other
person."'92 For purposes of this provision, a capital interest is "an
interest in the assets of the partnership, which is distributable to
the owner of the capital interest upon his withdrawal from the
partnership or upon liquidation of the partnership." '93 The mere
right to participate in the earnings and profits does not constitute
a capital interest." Capital is a material income-producing factor if
a substantial portion of the gross income of the business is attribu-
table to the use of capital; for example, capital is ordinarily a ma-
terial income-producing factor if the operation of the business re-
quires substantial inventories or a substantial investment in plant,
machinery, or other equipment.9 5
In Evans v. Commissioner,96 the Seventh Circuit stated that sec-
tion 704(e)(1) is a general definition applicable to all partnerships.
89. CRANE & BROMBERG, supra note 1, at 44.
90. U.P.A. § 27(1), 6 U.L.A. at 353.
91. Id.
92. I.R.C. § 704(e)(1) (1982).
93. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(e)(1)(v) (1964).
94. Id.
95. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(e)(1)(iv) (1964).
96. 447 F.2d 547 (7th Cir. 1971), aff'g 54 T.C. 40 (1970).
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Mr. Evans assigned his 50-percent interest in a two-man partner-
ship to his wholly-owned corporation solely in exchange for the
stock of that corporation. 7 His partner did not know about the
existence of the corporation or about the assignment, and partner-
ship tax returns continued to be filed listing Evans as a partner.
Checks from the partnership representing distributions were made
payable to Evans, but were deposited directly in his corporation's
bank account. Evans did not inform third persons dealing with the
partnership of the assignment, nor did he represent to them that
he was no longer a partner. He continued to perform services for
the partnership as he had prior to the assignment, but was paid a
salary by his corporation. Eventually, the assignment was discov-
ered, and Evans' partner purchased the interest Evans had as-
signed to the corporation. The sale proceeds were deposited di-
rectly into the corporation's bank account.
The Service argued that, because Evans did not obtain the con-
sent of his partner to the assignment or notify third parties, he
remained a partner after the assignment, having assigned no more
than his right to future partnership income. Under this analysis,
Evans remained responsible for 50 percent of all partnership in-
come even after the assignment, and for gain on the sale of the
partnership interest.
The Seventh Circuit affirmed the Tax Court's conclusion that
the assignment had effectively transferred to the corporation all of
Evans' interest in the partnership, and not merely the right to fu-
ture income."s This was true even though the assignment did not
terminate the original partnership under state law. Tax termina-
tion, which is independent of the termination or continuation of a
partnership under state law, had automatically occurred on the
transfer to the corporation because it involved the sale or exchange
of 50 percent of the total interest in partnership capital and profits
97. Evans' goal was to fall within the nonrecognition provisions of section 351 of the
Code.
98. The court stated:
Under Wisconsin law a partner's interest in the partnership is his share of the
profits and surplus. This interest is personal property and is assignable. An assign-
ment of a partnership interest entitles the assignee to receive the profits to which
the assigning partner would otherwise be entitled and, in the case of a dissolution
of the partnership, entitles the assignee to receive the assignor's interest. And it
appears that there is no requirement that consent to the assignment be obtained
from the other partners.
54 T.C. at 49.
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within a 12 month period."' Because the corporation acquired a
capital interest in a business in which capital was a material in-
come producing factor, it became a tax partner in a new partner-
ship by virtue of Section 704(e)(1).
C. Tenants in Common as Tax Partners
People who are tenants in common for state law purposes are
often deemed partners for federal income tax purposes, and it is
not always clear when this will happen. Part of the reason it does
happen is the Code's broad definition of partnership which in-
cludes any "unincorporated organization through or by means of
which any business, financial operation or venture is carried on,
and which is not . . . a corporation or a trust or estate."'00 The
regulations, however, leave room for certain profit-seeking co-own-
ers to fall outside the definition of partnership. 101 They provide
that a joint undertaking "merely to share expenses" does not con-
stitute a partnership.102 The regulations provide, for example, that
no partnership exists if two or more persons jointly construct a
ditch merely to drain surface waters from their property, and fur-
ther indicate that an asset that is independently income producing
may be co-owned without the creation of a tax partnership. "Mere
co-ownership of property which is maintained, kept in repair, and
rented or leased does not constitute a partnership."103 The scope of
this last sentence is unclear, and the possibility of a narrow con-
struction is suggested by the illustrative example that follows it:
"For example, if an individual owner, or tenants in common, of
farm property lease it to a farmer for a cash rental or a share of
the crops, they do not necessarily create a partnership thereby."'14
The case of the individual owner suggests the state law rule that
profit sharing is not prima facie evidence of partnership if it is
paid as "rent to a landlord."' 0 5 The case of rented co-owned land
suggests not only the rule that the co-owners will not become part-
ners with someone who is more properly deemed their tenant, but
99. I.R.C. § 708(b)(1)(B) (1982). See also Rev. Rul. 77-137, 1977-1 C.B. 178 (1977), in
which the assignee of a limited partnership interest was ruled a tax partner.
100. I.R.C. §§ 761(a), 7701(a)(2) (1982).
101. See also discussion of opportunity to "elect out" of the provisions of Subchapter K
infra at section V A-I.
102. Treas. Reg. § 1.761-1(a) (1972).
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. U.P.A. § 7(4)(b), 6 U.L.A. at 39.
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also the further rule that the co-owners of the rented land will not
themselves be deemed partners. Further language also suggests
that income-producing property may be co-owned without the
presence of partnership, but only if the investment is a fairly pas-
sive one:
Tenants in common ... may be partners if they actively carry on
a trade, business, financial operation, or venture and divide the
profits thereof. For example, a partnership exists if co-owners of
an apartment building lease space and in addition provide ser-
vices to the occupants either directly or through an agent.'06
The language "and in addition provide services" suggests that for
federal income tax purposes, as well as for state law purposes, it is
the presence of business activity by the co-owners that can trigger
a finding of partnership.
Although consistency in result is probably too much to expect,
Revenue Ruling 75-37401 suggests the maximum level of business
activity that may be present before co-owners will be deemed tax
partners: A life insurance company and a real estate investment
trust each owned an undivided one-half interest in an apartment
project that was operated and maintained by an unrelated manage-
ment corporation. The management company performed services
"customarily associated with maintenance and repair," including
heat, air conditioning, hot and cold water, unattended parking,
normal repairs, trash removal, and cleaning of public areas. Cus-
tomary services were furnished to tenants at no additional charge
above their basic rental. All costs incurred by the management
company in rendering the customary services were absorbed by the
co-owners, each of whom paid the management company "a per-
centage of one half of the gross rental receipts derived from the
operation of the project" as compensation for the customary ser-
vices. The management company also performed certain "addi-
tional services," including attendant parking, cabanas, and gas,
electricity and other utilities. The additional services were fur-
106. Tress. Reg. § 1.761-1(a) (1972). See also Tress. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(2) (1977):
Since associates and an objective to carry on business for joint profit are essen-
tial characteristics of all organizations engaged in business for profit (other than
the so-called one-man corporation and the sole proprietorship), the absence of ei-
ther of these essential characteristics will cause an arrangement among co-owners
of property for the development of such property for the separate profit of each
not to be classified as an association.
107. 1975-2 C.B. 261.
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nished to the tenants for a separate charge. The management com-
pany bore all the costs incurred in providing the additional ser-
vices and retained for its own use all the charges paid for them,
which were stated to be adequate compensation.
The Ruling stated that the furnishing of customary services in
connection with the maintenance and repair of an apartment pro-
ject does not render a co-ownership a partnership. "However, the
furnishing of additional services will render a coownership a part-
nership if the additional services are furnished directly by the
coowners or through their agent."' 08 It was ruled that, by reason of
the contractual arrangement with the management company, the
co-owners were not furnishing the additional services either di-
rectly or through an agent. The Ruling emphasized that the man-
agement company was solely responsible for determining the time
and manner of furnishing the services, bore all the expenses of pro-
viding them, and retained for its own use all the income they pro-
duced. None of the profits arising from the additional services were
divided with the life insurance company or the real estate invest-
ment trust. Therefore, they were "treated as coowners and not as
partners."
D. Partnership versus Other Relationships
When it is clear that business activity is present, the question is
whether people are participating in that activity as partners or
whether their association should be classified as something other
than partnership. As under state law, the dividing line between
partnership and other unincorporated relationships is not always
clear. Although state law classification of a relationship is not con-
trolling for tax purposes, tax disputes frequently involve an inquiry
into the "business" or "economic" reality of a transaction. This, in
turn, typically involves an inquiry into the legal consequences of
the transaction under state law. Accordingly, tax opinions usually
involve a discussion of the same kinds of factors that are discussed
in state law classification cases, and the results are often the same.
Thus, for example, disputes have involved whether profit sharers
should be deemed tax partners despite the fact that management
and control is concentrated in someone else, 10 9 or whether they
108. Id. The Ruling did not state precisely what issue was involved. It appears to have
concerned the passive investment requirements of real estate investment trusts.
109. See, e.g., Podell v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 429, 432 (1970), in which an attorney who
passively furnished a portion of the money to acquire and renovate buildings was held a tax
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should be more properly characterized as employees rather than
partners, 10 as landlords or tenants rather than partners,"' as lend-
partner:
The fact that petitioner did not exercise as much managerial control over the
day-to-day activities relating to the purchase, renovation and sale of the real es-
tate as Young is not sufficient reason for this Court to find against the existence of
a joint venture. While petitioner gave Young discretion with respect to all aspects
of the purchase, renovation, and sale of the real estate in question, petitioner re-
tained the power to approve of the steps undertaken by Young to execute their
agreement through his control over his continued contribution of funds to the
venture.
110. In Luna v. Commissioner, 42 T.C. 1067, 1077-78 (1964), the Tax Court stated that
the following factors, none of which is conclusive, bear on the issue whether a contract to
share profits is one of employment or partnership:
The agreement of the parties and their conduct in executing its terms; the contri-
butions, if any, which each party has made to the venture; the parties' control
over income and capital and the right of each to make withdrawals; whether each
party was a principal and coproprietor, sharing a mutual proprietary interest in
the net profits and having an obligation to share losses, or whether one party was
the agent or employee of the other, receiving for his services contingent compensa-
tion in the form of a percentage of income; whether business was conducted in the
joint names of the parties; whether the parties filed Federal partnership returns or
otherwise represented to [the Service] or to persons with whom they dealt that
they were joint venturers; whether separate books of account were maintained for
the venture; and whether the parties exercised mutual control over and assumed
mutual responsibilities for the enterprise.
Even if the profitsharing "employee" shares to a limited extent in losses, he will not be
deemed a tax partner if his profit share is received "as compensation for services and not
through a vested and continued interest in a joint venture or partnership." Rosenberg v.
Commissioner, 15 T.C. 1, 9 (1950). The Rosenberg court felt that the absence of a proprie-
tary interest was indicated by a variety of factors: the taxpayer's contract was stated to be
simply one of employment; he did not share personal liability for debts of the business; his
responsibilities and duties under the contract and even his rights to his "Bonus Account"
were carefully circumscribed and subject to change at the pleasure of the employer; and he
was not consulted about certain important business decisions. Id. at 8-9.
111. Factors that determine whether a purported landlord-tenant relationship consti-
tutes a tax partnership appear to be similar to those that determine whether a purported
employment relationship constitutes a tax partnership. The court in University Hill Found.
v. Commissioner, 51 T.C. 548 (1969), rev'd on other grounds, 446 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 405 U.S. 965 (1972), refused to hold that a "lessor" was a tax partner of its
"lessee." Neither of the "critical elements" of "the existence of controls over the venture
and a risk of loss in the taxpayer" were present. Id. at 568. The taxpayer did not participate
in the day-to-day management of the leased premises; its inspection rights and veto powers
"were not inconsistent with the simple objective of an owner of property in making certain
that the value of his ownership and his right to receive the payments due him not be dissi-
pated by a third party in possession." Id. The taxpayer
did share in expenses to a degree, since such expenses were charged against in-
come in arriving at net profits and the "rent" paid to petitioner was a percentage
participation of profits. This element is often one indication of a joint venture but
standing alone it is not enough. This is particularly true where, as is the case
herein, petitioner was not required to contribute to losses. If losses occurred, peti-
tioner simply did not collect any rent for the particular period.
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ers 1 2 or guarantors rather than partners, and so forth." 3
IV. CONSEQUENCES OF TAX PARTNERSHIP
A. The Partnership as Tax-Computing Entity
If a partnership is deemed to exist for federal income tax pur-
poses, it will be subject to the rules of Subchapter K contained in
sections 701-761. 14 Some of these rules can be advantageous to
taxpayers, while others can be unanticipated and extremely disad-
vantageous. Most basically, the income or loss of the business must
be computed and reported at the partnership level.
Just as for state law purposes the partnership is seen as a sepa-
rate entity that owns its own assets and conducts its own business,
Id. at 568-69. A lessor and lessee who had attempted to draft away partnership status were
nevertheless held to be tax partners in Haley v. Commissioner, 203 F.2d 815 (5th Cir. 1953),
rev'g 16 T.C. 1509 (1951), acq. 1952-1 C.B. 2. The "lease" agreement was coupled with a
"purchase" agreement, the combined provisions of which took the participants beyond the
normal realm of the landlord-tenant relationship.
112. Purported "loans" to partnerships can be recharacterized as contributions to capi-
tal. Rules that distinguish debt from equity, although developed primarily in the corporate
context, also apply in the partnership area
Numerous factors . . . are pertinent to the question whether a debtor-creditor
relationship has been established for tax purposes. Such factors as adequacy of
the capitalization of the debtor, issuance of any notes, provision for and payment
of interest, presence or absence of a maturity date, intention to repay, whether the
alleged debt is subordinated to claims of outside creditors, whether outside credi-
tors would have made similar advances under the circumstances, presence or ab-
sence of security for the alleged loan, reasonableness of expectation of payment,
use to which the funds were put, and whether payment can only be paid out of
future profits, are a few of those most frequently mentioned. . . . Although no one
factor by itself is determinative of the question, a significant factor is "whether
the funds were advanced with reasonable expectations of repayment regardless of
the success of the venture, or were placed at the risk of the business."
Hambuechen v. Commissioner, 43 T.C. 90, 99-100 (1964) (citations omitted). See also Hart-
man v. Commissioner 17 T.C.M. (CCH) 1020, 1023 (1958): "[W]here the party receiving the
money assumes no obligation for its return and it is subject to the hazard of the business,
the parties have been generally held to be joint venturers notwithstanding the money is to
be repaid with interest before the net profits are to be divided."
113. Against a strong dissent, the court in O'Hare v. Commissioner, 641 F.2d 83 (2d Cir.
1981), af'g 39 T.C.M. (CCH) 1006 (1980), denied the taxpayer's claim that his exposure as
title holder and mortgagor was so great that he should be deemed a tax partner, rather than
merely a guarantor for a contingent fee. For detailed discussion of partnerships versus other
economic relationships for tax purposes, see SPADA & RUGE, PARTNERSHIPS-STATUTORY
OUTLINE AND DEFINITION, Tax Management Portfolio 161-2d (1975), W. McKFE, W. NELSON
& R. WHITMIRE, FEDERAL TAXATION OF PARTNERSHIPS AND PARTNERS § 3.03 (1977), and 1 A.
WILLIS, J. PENNELL & P. POSTLEWAITE, PARTNERSHIP TAXATION, §§ 3.01-.08 (3d ed. 1982).
114. There is an opportunity for certain types of partnerships to be excluded from the
operation of some or all of Subchapter K. See the discussion of I.R.C. § 761(a) (1982), infra,
at section V A.
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it is also treated as a separate entity for many federal income tax
purposes. Even though the partnership is not a tax paying entity,
as is a corporation, it is a tax computing entity, and one that
wrests certain decisions from the hands of its members. The part-
nership has its own taxable year and it, rather than the individual
partners, makes the basic decisions with respect to the computa-
tion of partnership income.1 5 The partnership computes taxable
income or loss in much the same manner as an individual," 6 and
files a partnership return." 7 Because there is no tax due at the
partnership level, the purpose of the partnership return is to indi-
cate how the tax results of partnership operation are "passed
through" to the partners and allocated among them by their part-
nership agreement."' The character of a partner's distributive
share of partnership income or loss, however, is determined at the
partnership level. 1 9 Indeed, in computing partnership taxable in-
come or loss, the partnership itself makes numerous significant
elections that bind all partners not only to the character of income
or loss, but also to its amount and timing. 20 It determines, for ex-
ample, the method of computing depreciation of partnership prop-
erty, '2 whether to use a cash or accrual method of accounting, 22
whether to report income from an installment sale on an install-
ment method,'23 and whether certain optional adjustments will be
made with respect to the basis of partnership property. 2 4 Certain
elections can only be made at the partnership level. 2 5 For exam-
ple, if a partnership fails to elect to reinvest a condemnation award
in property of like kind, an individual partner may not elect to do
so with his share of the award.26 The importance of the partner-
ship as an entity that binds all its members was increased dramati-
cally by The Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982
115. I.R.C. § 703(b) (1982).
116. I.R.C. § 703(a) (1982).
117. I.R.C. § 6031 (1982).
118. I.R.C. § 704(a) (1982).
119. I.R.C. §§ 702(b), 6221 (1982). See, e.g., Podell v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 429, 433
(1970): "[I]t is the intent of the partnership and not that of any specific partner which is
determinative in characterizing the income for purposes of taxation."
120. I.R.C. § 703(b) (1982).
121. I.R.C. § 167 (1982).
122. I.R.C. §§ 446(c), 703(b) (1982); Treas. Reg. § 1.703-1(b) (1974).
123. I.R.C. § 453 (1982).
124. See I.R.C. §§ 734, 743, 755 (1982).
125. I.R.C. § 703(b) (1982).
126. McManus v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 197 (1975), aff'd, 583 F.2d 443 (9th Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 440 U.S. 959 (1979).
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(TEFRA), which introduced rules for binding audits at the part-
nership level.12 7
B. The Separate Partnership Interest
We have seen that for state law purposes an entity theory is re-
flected in the tenancy in partnership and that each partner's inter-
est is in his share of the profits and surplus, and not a direct share
in underlying partnership assets. The same basic approach is taken
for federal income tax purposes. Each partner is seen to have a
separate interest in his partnership. Just as for state law purposes
that separate interest is generally seen as an interest in personal
property, for tax purposes that interest is generally seen as a capi-
tal asset. Thus, the gain or loss that must be reported by a partner
when he sells or exchanges his partnership interest is generally re-
ported as capital gain or loss.128
There are, however, exceptions to the general rule of capital gain
or loss treatment. In certain situations, the Code requires that the
sale or exchange of a partnership interest be fragmented into its
ordinary and capital components. If there are certain ordinary in-
come assets, known as "section 751 assets," that lie behind a part-
nership interest, the partner selling his interest will be treated as if
he were trading in the underlying assets.1 29 Similarly, certain dis-
tributions to a partner will result in ordinary income if they are
made because he has, in effect, sold his share of certain ordinary
income assets. The purpose of these so-called "collapsible partner-
ship" rules is to prevent the entity theory of partnerships from be-
ing relied on to convert ordinary income into capital gain.
The general rule of "no peeking" behind the partnership interest
is perhaps best demonstrated by M.H.S. Company, Inc. v. Com-
missioner,8 0 in which a corporation had some of its real property
condemned. It reinvested the real property condemnation award
by purchasing shopping center property with another company as
equal tenants in common. The court held that the tenants in com-
mon were, as a matter of law, partners, and that, therefore, what
the corporation had acquired was not real property, but an interest
in a partnership, which is personal property. Accordingly, the pro-
ceeds of the real property condemnation award were not reinvested
127. See I.R.C. §§ 6221-6232 (1982).
128. I.R.C. § 741 (1982).
129. I.R.C. § 751(a) (1982).
130. 35 T.C.M. (CCH) 733 (1976), aff'd per curiam, 575 F.2d 1177 (6th Cir. 1978).
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in property of "like kind," and the corporation was required to rec-
ognize gain on the condemnation award.
C. Partner's Basis in Separate Partnership Interest
It is difficult to give a short statement of the rules that govern a
partner's basis in his partnership interest. This section is offered to
identify the basic variables that determine each partner's basis ac-
count in his partnership interest. Some of the consequences of in-
advertent tax partnerships cannot be understood without some ap-
preciation of the basis rules.
The rules that govern the determination of a partner's basis in
his partnership interest sometime require a bit of getting used to
by newcomers to partnership tax whose notion of basis was devel-
oped in the context of an individual's ownership of a depreciable
asset, such as a building. Essentially, an individual's basis in a
building is its cost less any depreciation deductions he is subse-
quently allowed. Nothing could be more simple than that initial
cost minus depreciation deductions equals adjusted basis, which
might most easily be thought of as a measure of unrecovered cost
for tax purposes. Throw that building into a partnership and
things get complicated, in part because a separate entity, the part-
nership, is deemed to be created. The partnership will now have its
own basis'31 in the building, which will be adjusted in the same
manner as an individual owner's basis in a building. 1 2 The part-
nership entity's basis in its assets is referred to by many as "inside
basis," that is, the basis the asset has inside the partnership. It is
the partner's separate basis in his partnership interest, referred to
as "outside basis," that gives newcomers pause. Although it is true
that a partnership's basis in its assets is often equal to the sum of
the partners' bases in their partnership interests, a partner's basis
in his partnership interest increases and decreases for a greater
number of reasons than does an individual's or a partnership's ba-
sis in a depreciable asset.
If a person becomes a partner by purchasing part or all of the
interest of an existing partner, his initial basis in his partnership
interest is his cost. 33 On the other hand, a person who is admitted
131. If a partnership purchases a building, its initial basis in the building is the build.
ing's cost. If the building is contributed to the partnership by one of its members, the part-
nership's initial basis in the building is the adjusted basis the partner had in the building.
I.R.C. § 723 (1982).
132. But see the result of certain distributions, Treas. Reg. § 1.734-2(b)(1) (1956).
133. I.R.C. §§ 742, 752(a) (1982).
1983]
30 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
to membership upon contribution to the partnership has an initial
basis in his partnership interest that includes the amount of
money he contributes, plus the adjusted basis of any property he
contributes.'34 Ordinarily, no gain or loss is recognized to the part-
nership or to any of its partners when property is contributed to
the partnership in exchange for an interest in the partnership.'35
In general, there is no recognition of any gain or loss that may
have been realized; the partner's basis in the property he contrib-
utes becomes the partnership's basis in that property and also be-
comes his initial basis in his partnership interest. To the extent,
however, that a partner receives his interest as compensation for
services, he will have to include the value in income, and will
thereby get an additional "tax cost basis" in his partnership
interest.3 6
There is an additional way a partner may realize gain when he
contributes property to a partnership. When a partner contributes
encumbered property, he is deemed to receive a distribution of
cash from the partnership to the extent that his fellow partners
undertake a share in the liabilities that encumber that property.' 7
Consider, for example, Contributor A who acquires a 20% interest
in a partnership by contributing property that has a fair market
value of $10,000, an adjusted basis of $4,000, and that is subject to
a mortgage of $6,000. Contributor A's basis in his partnership in-
terest is zero, computed as follows:
134. I.R.C. § 722 (1982).
135. I.R.C. § 721(a) (1982). Alternatively, a partner could sell property to his partnership
or simply permit the partnership to use it. See Tress. Reg. § 1.721-1(a) (1956). I.R.C. §
721(b) (1982) provides that the general nonrecognition rule "shall not apply to gain realized
on a transfer of property to a partnership which would be treated as an investment company
(within the meaning of section 351) if the partnership were incorporated."
136. Tress. Reg. § 1.722-1 (1956): "If the acquisition of an interest in partnership capital
results in taxable income to a partner, such income shall constitute an addition to the basis
of the partner's interest. See paragraph (b) of § 1.721-1." The same rule should apply when
the receipt of an interest in partnership profits constitutes taxable income.
137. I.R.C. § 752(b) (1982) provides in part: "[Any decrease in a partner's individual
liabilities by reason of the assumption by the partnership of such individual liabilities, shall
be considered as a distribution of money to the partner by the partnership." The same rule
applies even though the partnership simply takes "subject to" those liabilities.
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Adjusted basis to A of property
contributed $4,000
Less portion of mortgage
undertaken by other partners
which must be treated as a
distribution
(80% of $6,000) 4,800
$ (800)
Because A's basis cannot be less than zero,' the $800 by which
the "deemed distribution" of cash exceeds his basis is treated as
gain from the sale or exchange of a partnership interest.13 9
Conversely, a partner's initial basis in his partnership interest is
increased by the extent to which he undertakes a share of partner-
ship liabilities. 40 Consider, for example, money partner A who ac-
quires a 20% interest in a partnership by contributing $10,000
cash at a time when the partnership has property encumbered by a
$40,000 mortgage. A will be deemed to share in the mortgage for
basis purposes to the extent of $8,000 (20% of $40,000). Stated
differently, A will be deemed to have made a contribution of cash
in the amount of $8,000. Hence, A's basis in his partnership inter-
est is $18,000 (his $10,000 actual cash contribution plus his $8,000
deemed cash contribution). If $1,000 of mortgage principal is sub-
sequently repaid, A's 20% share of the mortgage will be decreased
by $200, and he will be deemed to receive a distribution of cash in
that amount.
A partner's initial basis in his partnership interest, adjusted to
reflect deemed contributions and distributions caused by taking on
and passing on shares of liabilities, is increased by his share of
partnership income. 1" Conversely, his basis in his partnership in-
terest is decreased by his distributive share of partnership loss. 142
It is also decreased by the amount of any cash he receives in either
an actual or a deemed distribution, 43 and by the adjusted basis of
any property distributed to him. 144
138. I.R.C. § 705(a)(2) (1982).
139. Treas. Reg. § 1.722-1 (1956) Example(2).
140. I.R.C. § 752(a) (1982): "Any increase in a partner's share of the liabilities of a part-
nership, or any increase in a partner's individual liabilities by reason of the assumption by
such partner of partnership liabilities, shall be considered as a contribution of money by
such partner to the partnership." A partner's share of partnership liabilities is determined
in accordance with Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1(e) (1956).
141. I.R.C. § 705(a)(1)(A) (1982).
142. I.R.C. § 705(a)(2)(A) (1982).
143. I.R.C. § 733(1) (1982).
144. I.R.C. § 733(2) (1982) (in the case of a nonliquidating distribution).
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Part of the reason for the continuing succession of upward and
downward adjustments is to reflect that a partner must report his
share of the income computed and reported at the partnership
level, whether any cash behind that income is distributed to him or
not. Consider, for example, an equal two-person partnership, AB,
that computes a taxable income of $100. Each equal partner must
report $50 of taxable income even if the $50 cash that lies behind
the taxable income is not distributed to him. Each will have his
basis in his partnership interest increased by $50, so that when the
$50 cash is subsequently distributed, it will not be taxed. The ac-
tual distribution of cash will simply eliminate the increase in basis
he previously received when and because he reported his distribu-
tive share of taxable income. Suppose, for further example, that
when the $100 cash is eventually distributed, it is not divided
equally but is distributed entirely to B. B's basis in his partnership
interest, which was increased by his $50 share of the partnership's
taxable income, will be decreased by the $100 cash distribution,
but not below zero. To the extent the distribution exceeds B's ba-
sis in his partnership interest, he must recognize gain.1 45
In short, distributions themselves are not taxed 4" unless the
amount of money distributed exceeds the distributee partner's ad-
justed basis in his partnership interest immediately prior to the
distribution.147 This is true whether the distribution is a current
(nonliquidating) distribution or a distribution in liquidation of a
partner's interest. Loss, on the other hand, can only be recognized
on a distribution if the distribution is in liquidation of a partner's
interest. 48 In the event of a liquidating distribution, loss is allowed
145. I.R.C. § 731(a)(1) (1982).
146. I.R.C. § 731(b) (1982).
147. I.R.C. § 731(a)(1) (1982). But see the discussion of the "collapsible partnership"
rules in I.R.C. § 751(b) (1982). The basic idea is that a distribution may be taxed even if it
is not in excess of basis if it is in effect a payment to a partner for some or all of his share of
certain ordinary income assets.
148. I.R.C. § 731(a)(2) (1982):
(a) PsARTNEas-In the case of a distribution by a partnership to a partner -
(2) loss shall not be recognized to such partner, except that upon a distribution
in liquidation of a partner's interest in a partnership where no property other
than that described in subparagraph (A) or (B) is distributed to such partner, loss
shall be recognized to the extent of the excess of the adjusted basis of such part-
ner's interest in the partnership over the sum of -
(A) any money distributed, and
(B) the basis to the distributee, as determined under section 732, of any un-
realized receivables (as defined in section 751(c)) and inventory (as defined in sec-
tion 751(d)(2)).
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if only money and certain section 751 assets are distributed and
the distributee partner's adjusted basis in his partnership interest
exceeds the amount of money and the adjusted basis, to him, of
section 751 assets. " " Suffice it to say for the moment that section
751 assets are assets that would produce ordinary income if sold by
the partnership. The terribly complex rules of section 751 are basi-
cally designed to require the recognition of ordinary income on the
sale of an interest in a partnership that holds section 751 assets
and on certain distributions from such a partnership.150
In general, if property is distributed to a partner other than in
liquidation of his interest, the partnership's adjusted basis in the
property becomes the distributee partner's basis in that property,
which he now holds in his individual capacity.' 5' There is, however,
a ceiling on the amount of partnership basis that can be passed to
the distributee. The partner who receives property in a current
(nonliquidating) distribution may not receive a basis in the distrib-
uted property that exceeds his adjusted basis in his partnership
interest reduced by any money distributed in the same transac-
tion." 2 Distributions that liquidate a partner's interest in the part-
nership are treated differently than current distributions. The
partner who receives a liquidating distribution that includes prop-
erty will have his adjusted basis in his partnership interest, re-
duced by any money distributed in the same transaction, substi-
tuted as his new basis in the property. 5
D. Consequences of Inadvertent Partnership
In Helmer v. Commissioner,154 a holding that property held in
the names of two individuals was owned by a partnership resulted
in the recognition of gain in a situation in which there would be no
gain under co-ownership classification. The Tax Court found that a
cattle-raising partnership whose members were two brothers,
rather than the brothers as co-owners, owned land that was op-
tioned to a development corporation. 15 5 The option called for an
149. Id.
150. See I.R.C. § 751(a)-(b) (1982).
151. I.R.C. § 732(a)(1) (1982).
152. I.R.C. § 732(a)(2) (1982).
153. I.R.C. § 732(b) (1982). For the rules to allocate basis among distributed properties,
see I.R.C. § 732(c) (1982).
154. 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 727 (1975).
155. The holding that the land was owned by the partnership is not surprising. Although
the brothers never entered into any formal or written partnership agreement, partnership
returns in the name of "Helmer Brothers" were filed for each of the years in question. Al-
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initial payment of $150,000 and annual payments of $75,000. Upon
exercise of the option, the purchase price was to be reduced by the
amount of option payments made, but there was no provision for
refund of the payments should the agreement terminate. Payments
were made to an escrow agent, which distributed them to the Hel-
mer brothers after subtracting taxes, interest, and principal due on
the property. During the three years in question, the optionee
made the required payments and neither forfeited nor exercised
the option. The escrow agent paid the Helmers by checks which
they endorsed and deposited into their personal bank accounts
rather than into their partnership bank account.
It was held that the checks deposited into the brothers' personal
accounts constituted distributions of cash from the partnership.
The service had: "conceded that the income from the option pay-
ments was deferrable by the partnership until characterized as or-
dinary income (because of a default by the optionee) or capital
gains (because of an exercise of the option by the optionee)."15
Nevertheless, the court held that the distribution to the two broth-
ers from their own partnership was a taxable event. They were re-
quired to pay tax to the extent the distributions exceeded their
bases in their partnership interests. 157 The court confessed that its
holding "may run counter to the general concept of subchapter K
that the partnership is a conduit as to income and loss items."' 8
though the evidence was "cursory at the best" as to whether the land in question was owned
by the brothers individually or by their partnership,
the partnership books and tax returns for 1966 through 1969 listed the land sub-
ject to the option as an asset of the partnership. The balance sheets of the part-
nership returns . . . also listed the allocable part of the option deposit payments
to George and T.L. Helmer as partnership liabilities. The amounts received di-
rectly by petitioners were reflected as distributions to them on pertinent tax re-
turns and on the partnership books.. . . Having represented to the Internal Rev-
enue Service that this property was owned by the partnership, the partners are
bound by such representation.
Id. at 729-30.
156. Id. at 731.
157. The brothers alternatively argued that no gain arose because the distributions of
cash were not in excess of their bases in their partnership interests. Their theory was that
the receipt of the option payments created a partnership liability in which they shared for
basis purposes. See I.R.C. § 752(a) (1982) and Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1(a)(1) (1960). The Tax
Court held that no partnership liability was created. There was no provision for repayment
of the amounts paid should the agreement terminate, and there was no restriction on the
amounts paid other than that on any exercise of the option the amounts paid would be
applied against the purchase price.
158. The Tax Court obviously felt uncomfortable with its decision and suggested the
case might have been litigated differently:
We believe that the problem created in this case is analogous to the receipt of tax-
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The result was an application of strict entity theory of partner-
ships. The partnership was seen as an entity which cut the part-
ners off from the underlying transaction; they were not permitted
to look behind the partnership entity to see that the cash they re-
ceived was traceable to income that could be deferred until its
character as ordinary income or capital gain was established.
As pointed out above, if a partnership is deemed to exist, it as an
entity, rather than its individual members, is entitled to make a
wide range of important elections to defer recognition of gain. If
the partnership as an entity does not so elect, the election is for-
feited and cannot be made pro rata by individual partners. A good
illustration of this preemption is McManus v. Commissioner,69 in
which the taxpayer was found to have been a partner of the two
individuals with whom he had purchased property, a portion of
which was condemned. He reinvested his share of the condemna-
tion proceeds and attempted to elect to defer the gain realized on
the condemnation sale under the provisions of Code section
1033.160 The court held that he could not avail himself of the 1033
election because of the presence of the partnership. The partner-
ship, rather than the partners individually, is entitled to make the
election, even though the Code specifies that nonrecognition is
available "at the election of the taxpayer."1 61 To emphasize, even
though the partnership is not a tax paying entity, it was seen as
the only "taxpayer" for the purpose of making the election.
One of the most striking recent applications of the entity theory
to an inadvertent tax partnership occurred in Madison Gas and
Electric Co. v. Commissioner.12 Madison Gas and Electric Com-
pany (MGE) was a public utility that had been involved since 1896
in the production and distribution of electricity. In 1967, MGE
signed a "Joint Power Supply Agreement" with two other utilities
exempt income under section 705(a)(1)(B) which permits a partner's basis to be
increased by the amount of such income so that upon distribution there will be no
recognition of gain in excess of basis. . . .Neither party, however, raised the issue
of whether, under other provisions of subchapter K, there would not be recogni-
tion of income to the petitioners in this case. We therefore express no opinion
with regard to issues other than those raised by the parties as noted on page 2 of
this opinion.
34 T.C.M. (CCH), at 731 n.4.
159. 65 T.C. 197 (1975), afl'd, 583 F.2d 443 (9th Cir. 1978).
160. I.R.C. § 1033 (1982) provides an opportunity to defer recognition of gain on the
involuntary conversion of property by reinvesting the proceeds in property of like kind.
161. I.R.C. § 1033(a)(2)(A) (1982). See also Demirjian v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 1691,
1698-1701 (1970), aff'd, 457 F.2d 1 (3d Cir. 1972).
162. 633 F.2d 512 (7th Cir. 1980).
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to construct, own and operate a nuclear plant to generate electric-
ity. Under state law, the utilities owned and operated the plant as
tenants in common. It was the intention of the utilities to create
only a co-tenancy with an expense-sharing arrangement and not a
partnership. MGE deducted certain expenditures incurred to train
employees for the new plant and to establish procedures for the
safe operation of the new plant, claiming that they were section
162(a) ordinary and necessary expenses for carrying on the busi-
ness that they had been in for almost three-quarters of a cen-
tury.1" The Commissioner conceded that if no partnership existed
between MGE and the other utilities, MGE could deduct the ex-
penses under section 162.164 The government's position, which pre-
vailed, was that a partnership had been created among the three
utilities for federal income tax purposes, and that MGE's outlays
were nondeductible pre-operating expenditures toward the new
partnership business. The Seventh Circuit stressed that Congress
had intended to include in the definition of tax partnerships a
number of arrangements that are not partnerships under local law.
It rejected MGE's argument that there was no partnership because
there was no division of profit, each utility simply took its share of
the electricity generated and marketed it independently. It agreed
with the Tax Court's conclusion that "the Code definition of part-
nership does not require joint venturers to share in a single cash
profit and that to the extent that a profit motive is required by the
Code it is met here by the distribution of profits in kind." 165
MGE argued in the alternative that, even if a tax partnership
did exist, it should be recognized that MGE was a member solely
to expand its existing business such that expenditures toward the
partnership venture should not be seen as "pre-operating" capital
outlays. The Seventh Circuit rejected this argument, saying it was
tantamount to a request that the partnership be ignored for tax
purposes. Analogous to the tenancy in partnership under state
law,'66 the entity is seen as "cutting off" the partners from the
partnership assets and business. It has its own assets, it has its
own business, it is new, and its business is new. Hence, its initial
training and planning expenditures were "pre-operating" and capi-
163. I.R.C. § 162(a) (1982).
164. The concession was perhaps an unnecessary one that placed pressure on the court
to resolve the matter in favor of the government according to the stipulation: that deduct-
ibility would stand or fall on whether a tax partnership had been inadvertently created.
165. 633 F.2d at 515.
166. See infra section IIE.
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tal in nature.
Taken at face value, Madison Gas poses a troublesome policy
issue. If MGE had been large enough or wealthy enough to start its
very own nuclear plant, its outlays would have been deductible.
However, because its lack of wealth or other economies forced
MGE to participate with others, it was denied the deduction. It is
hard to see how the substance of the transaction varies enough to
require different tax results, at least when the partnership is
inadvertent.
E. Partnership Permits Flexibility
Thus far, much of the discussion in this article has emphasized
negative consequences of the unanticipated imposition of the rules
of Subchapter K. It is equally clear, however, that it can be ex-
tremely advantageous to taxpayers to fall within the rules of Sub-
chapter K. As indicated earlier, Congress intended that partners
are to have a great deal of flexibility to allocate among themselves
the tax consequences of partnership operations. A full discussion
of the use of partnership doctrine to time income, to change the
character of income, and even to vary the amount of income that
may be recognized, is outside the scope of this article. For our pur-
poses, the basic rules on partnership allocations suffice to illustrate
that there can be much good news in the imposition of Subchapter
K, particularly with proper planning. In general, partners are free
to determine in their "partnership agreement" how the tax conse-
quences of partnership operations will be allocated among them-
selves. 67 A "partnership agreement" is generously defined to in-
clude any modifications made up until the time required for the
filing of the partnership return.' 68 Although agreed-upon alloca-
tions will be disregarded if they lack "substantial economic ef-
fect,"'169 there remains great, congressionally intended flexibility to
allocate separately various tax benefits and burdens to the partners
who most need or can best bear them."' Co-owners who are inad-
vertent tax partners often fail to exercise the opportunity to allo-
cate in a way that reduces the overall tax burden of the partners.
Assume that a tax partnership will be formed at some point in a
167. I.R.C. § 704(a) (1982).
168. I.R.C. § 761(c) (1982).
169. I.R.C. § 704(b)(2) (1982).
170. See generally Weidner, Partnership Allocations And Tax Reform, 5 FLA. ST. U.L.
REv. 1 (1977).
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business relationship. The timing and manner of the formation
and capitalization of the partnership can be critical to the tax con-
sequences to be achieved. In some situations, for example, it will
be advantageous for new partners to rely on the general rule that
no gain or loss shall be recognized on the contribution of property
to a partnership.171 In other situations, it may be advantageous for
one or more partners to trigger the realization of gain on partner-
ship formation. McDougal v. Commissioner 172 involved such a situ-
ation, and the taxpayer used old-fashioned "horse sense" to triple
the amount of depreciation deductions that could be taken by his
partnership.
McDougal was a rancher who purchased a horse on January 1,
1968, for $10,000 and promised the trainer who recommended the
purchase that if he would train the horse to race he would receive
the standard trainer's fee plus a half interest in the horse upon the
rancher's recovery of acquisition costs. The horse began to race
with success and within a matter of months attracted offers to
purchase as high as $60,000. By October 4, 1968, the rancher had
recovered his costs and on that date transferred a 50% interest in
the horse to the trainer. The following day a "Bill of Sale" was
executed that described the transfer as a gift. The trainer contin-
ued to receive the standard training fee after the transfer. The
court found that on November 1, 1968, the rancher and trainer
had concluded a partnership agreement by parol to effectuate
their design of racing the horse for as long as that proved feasible
and of offering him out as a stud thereafter. Profits were to be
shared equally by the [rancher] and the [trainer], while losses
were to be allocated to the [rancher] alone.1 s
The oral agreement was not reduced to writing until April of 1970.
By amended returns,1"" the rancher claimed he transferred the
half interest in the horse as compensation for services and was en-
titled to a business expense deduction of $30,000, the value of the
half interest based on the last offer to purchase prior to the trans-
fer. He also reported the $30,000 as an amount realized and
171. I.R.C. § 721(a) (1982).
172. 62 T.C. 720 (1974).
173. Id. at 722.
174. The parties initially assumed reporting postures different than those reflected in
the amended returns. The rancher initially claimed no deduction by reason of the transfer
of the half interest to the trainer. The trainer initially reported additional gross income in
the amount of $5,000 that he identified as a gift interest in a racehorse.
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claimed long term capital gain on the amount by which the $30,000
exceeded his basis in the half interest." 6 Consistent with the
rancher's amended reporting posture, the trainer's amended re-
turns reported the value of the half interest as ordinary income
and further claimed that this inclusion in income gave him a
$30,000 "tax cost basis" in his half interest. Finally, "purporting to
have transferred the horse to a partnership in concert on Nov-
ember 1, 1968," they together claimed that the partnership's basis
in the horse was the sum of the rancher's adjusted basis in the half
interest he contributed plus the trainer's $30,000 tax cost basis in
the half interest he contributed. 7 s The inclusion of the trainer's
tax cost basis led the partnership to claim triple the amount of
depreciation deductions it had originally claimed. For 1969, the
partnership claimed a depreciation deduction of $5,602 and re-
ported a loss of $8,911. Pursuant to the partnership agreement, the
entire loss was allocated to the rancher.
The court held for the taxpayers on all points, except that it
found that the tax partnership was created by the October 4 trans-
fer rather than by the November 1 oral agreement. It rejected the
Commissioner's argument that the partnership's depreciable basis
in the horse was limited to the rancher's basis at the time of his
contribution:"17
When on the formation of a joint venture a party contributing
appreciated assets satisfies an obligation by granting his obligee a
capital interest in the venture, he is deemed first to have trans-
ferred to the obligee an undivided interest in the assets contrib-
uted, equal in value to the amount of the obligation so satisfied.
He and the obligee are deemed thereafter and in concert to have
contributed those assets to the joint venture. 7 8
The logic of this two-step analysis resulted in the holding that the
partnership's basis in the horse included the trainer's $30,000 "tax
175. The rancher reported a $25,000 gain on the transfer by charging all depreciation
deductions for the period prior to the transfer against his $5,000 basis in the half interest he
retained. The court said that the depreciation for those months would have to be allocated
between the half interest retained and the half interest transferred to the trainer.
176. The partnership's basis in contributed property is the contributing partner's ad-
justed basis in the property at the time of contribution. I.R.C. § 723 (1982).
177. The Commissioner had also argued that the transaction was a gift. The court re-
jected the gift analysis and was "undeterred in so doing by the fact that petitioners origi-
nally characterized the transfer as a gift" because the relationship of the parties "was essen-
tially of a business nature." 62 T.C. at 724-25.
178. Id. at 725.
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cost basis" in the half interest he contributed.
The court's explanation of its decision that the rancher was enti-
tled to a $30,000 business expense deduction is both curious and
significant. It began by stating:
When an interest in a joint venture is transferred as compensa-
tion for services rendered, any deduction which may be author-
ized under section 162(a)(1) by reason of that transfer is properly
claimed by the party to whose benefit the services accrued, be
that party the venture itself or one or more venturers .... 179
It reasoned that until the trainer received his interest, the rancher
was the "sole" owner of the horse and recipient of its earnings and
no joint venture existed. The court's conclusion that the rancher
"alone could have benefitted from the services rendered" prior to
the transfer is less than obvious. Every dollar of winnings from the
trainer's efforts brought him closer to the transfer of the half inter-
est in the horse that had rapidly and substantially appreciated in
value. The court's 'reasoning is significant because it could be ap-
plied in the case of a person who receives an interest in partner-
ship profits as compensation for services. It has been suggested
that the partnership gets a deduction for the value of the profits
interest which may be specially allocated to the recipient of the
profits interest so he will not be required to pay tax on a receipt
that has not yet resulted in cash in hand. McDougal appears to
suggest that such an approach is inappropriate because it allocates
the deduction away from those who bear the burden and reap the
benefit.180
179. Id. at 728.
180. The court apparently did not question the appropriateness of the allocation of the
entire 1969 partnership loss to the rancher. However, it did object to the extent to which the
rancher had claimed depreciation. It held that the partnership had been formed on October
4, not on November 1, and that the rancher "[was] entitled to claim depreciation" on the
horse "only until the transfer of October 4, 1968. Thereafter depreciation ... ought to have
been deducted by the joint venture in the computation of its taxable income." 62 T.C. at
726. The holding that the rancher was not entitled to claim depreciation after the formation
of the partnership is tantamount to a holding that it would be inappropriate, absent further
facts, for the partnership to specially allocate all depreciation to him. The fact that the
rancher reported all depreciation during the initial stage of the partnership's life could have
been treated as simply an informal special allocation of the depreciation deduction. McDou-
gal, therefore, is at least some authority for the proposition that a partner who agrees to
bear all economic losses may be allocated the entire amount of the partnership's overall tax
loss, but may not be allocated all depreciation deductions independent of other items of
income or loss.
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V. ELECTION OUT OF SUBCHAPTER K
We have seen that there are a variety of reasons why a particular
co-owner who is deemed a tax partner might wish to avoid the ap-
plication of some or all of the rules of Subchapter K. Most basi-
cally, he may want to independently compute the taxable income
or loss flowing from his pro rata share of the business. For exam-
ple, he may not wish to relinquish his choice of method of comput-
ing depreciation. Such a co-owner may find relief under the provi-
sions of section 761(a), which authorize regulations to permit
certain unincorporated organizations to elect to be excluded from
the application of all or a part of Subchapter K. The "election-
out" is one that can only be made with the consent of all of the
members of the organization, and only if their income may be ade-
quately determined without the computation of partnership taxa-
ble income. 11 The election is only available to organizations that
are availed of (1) for the joint production, extraction, or use of
property, but not for the purpose of selling services or property
produced or extracted; 82 (2) for investment purposes only, and not
for the active conduct of a business; 83 or (3) by dealers in securi-
ties for a short period for the purpose of underwriting, selling, or
distributing a particular issue of securities.' 8" The Tax Court has
said that the filing of a partnership return and an election-out
under section 761(a) are not admissions of partnership status.185
A. Operating Agreements
When the election-out provisions were first enacted in 1954, it
was clear that Congress had oil and gas operating agreements fore-
most in mind.' 6 The regulations are more specific than the Code
about the operating agreements that are eligible to elect to be ex-
cluded from all or a portion of Subchapter K, and they include
more than oil and gas arrangements. They describe participants in
the joint production, extraction, or use of property who
(i) Own the property as coowners, either in fee or under lease or
other form of contract granting exclusive operating rights, and
181. I.R.C. § 761(a) (1982).
182. I.R.C. § 761(a)(2) (1982).
183. I.R.C. § 761(a)(1) (1982).
184. I.R.C. § 761(a)(3) (1982).
185. Madison Gas, 72 T.C. at 558.
186. See Taubman, Oil and Gas Partnerships and Section 761(a), 12 TAx L. REV. 49
(1956).
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(ii) Reserve the right separately to take in kind or dispose of
their shares of any property produced, extracted, or used, and
(iii) Do not jointly sell services or the property produced or
extracted, although each separate participant may delegate au-
thority to sell his share of the property produced or extracted for
the time being for his account, but not for a period of time in
excess of the minimum needs of the industry, and in no event for
more than 1 year .... 15"
No election-out is available if one of the principal purposes of the
organization is cycling, manufacturing, or processing for persons
who are not members of the organization. 188
In Madison Gas,1 89 the taxpayer argued that, in providing the
election-out, Congress had in mind only oil, gas and mineral ven-
tures acting under operating agreements and that the election-out
provisions should not be broadly interpreted to include an operat-
ing agreement for the production of electricity. In rejecting this ar-
gument, the Seventh Circuit quoted commentary that Congress in-
tended to establish an election not only for oil and gas, but for all
types of operating agreements. 19
B. Investment Partnerships
Section 761(a)(1), which lists investment partnerships as a sepa-
rate category of organization eligible for election-out, was part of
the original election-out provision enacted in 1954. Basically, in-
vestments were included as a separate category, but subject to the
same kinds of tests as operating agreements. Congressional intent
behind the investment partnership category was not made clear in
the legislative history, but one leading commentator of the day
summarized the statutory scheme very nicely:
Investment as a method of passive business has generally been
sufficient to take a trust out of the association category and there-
fore not taxable as a corporation, since investment purpose is not
active business purpose. Investment not in the form of an associa-
tion or a trust might be in a form classifiable under the partner-
ship definition. As with oil and gas operating agreements, there is
a twilight zone between partnership classification and tenancy in
common. Government and the oil and gas industry have been in
187. Treas. Reg. § 1.761-2(a)(3) (1972).
188. Id.
189. 633 F.2d 512.
190. 633 F.2d at 515 n.2. See also Rev. Rul. 82-61, 1982-15 I.R.B. 5 (1982).
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disagreement for almost a quarter of a century about this. Con-
gress thus attempted to establish a workable formula which
would be valid not only for oil and gas, but all types of operating
agreements, as well as the related and equally difficult field of
investment.1
The regulations define investment partnerships eligible for the ex-
clusion to include participants in the joint purchase, retention,
sale, or exchange of investment property who
(i) Own the property as coowners,
(ii) Reserve the right separately to take or dispose of their
shares of any property acquired or retained, and
(iii) Do not actively conduct business or irrevocably authorize
some person or persons acting in a representative capacity to
purchase, sell, or exchange such investment property, although
each separate participant may delegate authority to purchase,
sell, or exchange his share of any such investment property . . .
but not for a period of more than a year. 2
C. Certain Dealers in Securities
The Revenue Act of 1978 imposed a penalty on partnerships
that fail to file a partnership return. 193 Historically, partnership re-
turns had not been filed in the case of syndicates of dealers in se-
curities formed for the purpose of underwriting, selling, or distrib-
uting a securities issue. 9 " Congress felt that "those syndicates
which historically have not been treated as partnerships should be
given the opportunity to avail themselves of the election under the
Code not to be treated as a partnership for income tax pur-
poses."' 95 Accordingly, the Technical Corrections Act of 1979
amended section 761(a) to add a third category of organizations
that may elect out of Subchapter K: those availed of "by dealers in
securities for a short period for the purpose of underwriting, sell-
ing, or distributing a particular issue of securities."'' 9
191. Taubman, supra note 186, at 67.
192. Treas. Reg. § 1.761-2(a)(2) (1972).
193. See I.R.C. § 6698 (1982).
194. S. REP. No. 498, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 46 (1979).
195. Id. Note that the legislative history incorrectly states the substantive result of the
section 761(a) election out. The election out is not "for income tax purposes" in general, it is
simply an election out of some or all of Subchapter K. See infra section V D. On the other
hand, that same legislative history is support for the position that Congress does not intend
such syndicates to be classified as partnerships for any purposes.
196. I.R.C. § 761(a)(3) (1982).
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D. Limited Effect of Electing Out
An important word of caution about the election out: it is not a
complete election out of partnership doctrine. Even if there is an
effective election out of all of Subchapter K, a partnership can ex-
ist for the purposes of tax rules that lie outside of Subchapter K.
Thus, in Madison Gas'97 even though the three utilities filed a
partnership return and elected out of Subchapter K, a partnership
was held to exist, a new entity was deemed to have been inadver-
tently created, with its own new business and with outlays that
were denied deductibility because they were pre-operating expend-
itures of that new partnership.
The section 761(a) election out is expressly limited to the provi-
sions of Subchapter K. Another statutory basis for finding that a
tax partnership can exist notwithstanding an election out of Sub-
chapter K is the definition of partnership outside of Subchapter K.
Section 7701(a)(2) defines partnership in essentially the same way
as section 761(a), except it, together with 7701(a)(1), defines and
declares a partnership to be a "person" for all purposes of the en-
tire Code, "where not otherwise distinctly expressed or manifestly
incompatible with the intent thereof."19
E. Time for Making Election for Exclusion
An eligible organization that wishes to be excluded from all of
Subchapter K must make the election not later than the time re-
quired for filing the partnership return for the first taxable year for
which exclusion from Subchapter K is desired.""9 Nevertheless,
even if the election is not timely made, it may be treated as if it
had been timely made if it can be shown that it was the intention
of the members of the organization at the time of formation to se-
cure exclusion from all of Subchapter K beginning with the first
taxable year of the organization. 00 The regulations provide that
the following are among the facts that may indicate the requisite
intent:
(a) at the time of the formation of the organization there is an
197. See infra section IV D.
198. I.R.C. § 7701(a)(1), (2) (1982). See also Bryant v. Commissioner, 399 F.2d 800 (5th
Cir. 1968), af'g 46 T.C. 848 (1966), in which taxpayers found to be partners were told that
they could not avoid the section 48(c)(2)(D) investment credit limitation on partnerships by
an election out of Subchapter K.
199. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.761-2(b)(1) (1972), 1.6031-1(e)(2) (1978).
200. Treas. Reg. § 1.761-2(b)(2)(ii) (1972).
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agreement among the members that the organization be excluded
from subchapter K beginning with the first taxable year of the
organization, or
(b) the members of the organization owning substantially all
of the capital interest report their respective shares of the items
of income, deductions and credits of the organization on their re-
spective returns (making such elections as to individual items as
may be appropriate) in a manner consistent with the exclusion of
the organization from subchapter K beginning with the first taxa-
ble year of the organization.2 '
F. Method of Making the Election
The election is to be made "in a statement attached to, or incor-
porated in, a properly executed partnership return, Form 1065. "2o2
Even though a partnership return must be filed to make the elec-
tion, the filing of the return and election will not be treated as an
admission of partnership status.2 03 The return shall be filed with
the internal revenue officer with whom a partnership return would
be filed if the organization were a partnership and no election were
made. The principal office or place of business of the person filing
the return shall be considered the principal office or place of busi-
ness of the organization.2 04 The partnership return shall contain, in
lieu of the information required by Form 1065, only the name and
address of the organization and, either on the return or an at-
tached statement: the names, addresses, and identification num-
bers of all the members of the organization; a statement that it
qualifies under the 761(a) regulations;0 5 a statement that all of the
members of the organization elect that it be excluded from all of
Subchapter K; and a statement indicating where a copy of the
agreement under which the organization operates is available (or if
the agreement is oral, from whom the provisions of the agreement
may be obtained).20 6
The election will be effective unless within 90 days after the for-
mation of the organization any member notifies the Commissioner
both that he wants Subchapter K to apply and that he has so noti-
fied the other members of the organization by registered or certi-
201. Id.
202. Treas. Reg. § 1.761-2(b)(2)(i) (1972).
203. Madison Gas 72 T.C. at 558.
204. Treas. Reg. § 1.761-2(b)(2)(i) (1972).
205. There are not yet regulations that specifically refer to section 761(a)(3).
206. Treas. Reg. § 1.761-2(b)(2)(i) (1972).
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fled mail.20 7 The election is irrevocable as long as the organization
remains qualified under the regulations, unless approval of revoca-
tion is obtained from the Commissioner. 20 8
An organization that wishes to be excluded from part, but not
all, of Subchapter K, must submit a request for partial exclusion
not later than 90 days after the beginning of the first taxable year
for which partial exclusion is desired. 0 9 The request should state
the sections of Subchapter K from which exclusion is sought, that
the organization qualifies under the regulations, and that the mem-
bers of the organization elect to be excluded to the extent indi-
cated. A request for a partial exclusion is only effective upon ap-
proval by the Commissioner, and is subject to any conditions he
might impose.210
VI. LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS UNDER STATE LAW
A. Historical Perspective
Perhaps the most interesting historical point to be made about
the limited partnership in the United States is that it began as a
corporate substitute. Today, it is the most ministerial of matters
for entrepreneurs to set up a corporation and thereby avoid the
unlimited personal liability imposed upon partners. Each state now
has a "general incorporation act," so-called because it is a single
statute that makes corporations generally available to anyone who
follows a purely mechanical procedure. Creating a corporation is
similar to what the process to obtain a driver's license would be if
competency testing were stripped away. The result of one or two
secretarial acts is the creation of what is, in the eyes of the law, a
separate legal person, of potentially infinite life, that can engage in
any lawful business activity. The general incorporation act pro-
vides for the relationships among the shareholders themselves, and
the fundamental rule that the corporate entity insulates sharehold-
ers from liability to the outside world for claims arising from cor-
porate business. General incorporation acts were hotly resisted
207. Treas. Reg. § 1.761-2(b)(3)(i) (1972).
208. Id.
209. Treas. Reg. § 1.761-2(c) (1972).
210. Id. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 58-465, 1958-2 C.B. 376, 377 (1958): "The approval ... re-
quired by [the regulations] regarding the exclusion ... from certain sections of Subchapter
K . . . will not be extended to section 704(d) . . . for the purpose of eliminating the limita-
tions on the allowance of a partner's distributive share of a partnership loss." See also Rev.
Rul. 57-215, 1957-1 C.B. 208 (1957).
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throughout a large portion of our nation's history.2 ' In the begin-
ning of the nineteenth century, the idea of the large corporation
was viewed as vaguely un-American. It sounded too much like ad-
vocacy for a return to a royal family, self-perpetuating, aggrandiz-
ing and above-the-law, to urge the creation of legal persons, of po-
tentially infinite life, behind whom the wealthy classes could hide,
to engage in any activity and accumulate unlimited wealth. Ini-
tially, state legislatures would create corporations no faster than
one at a time; it took a special statute to create each corporation.
Shareholder freedom from personal liability was seen as an ex-
traordinary statutory privilege; the personal liability of partners
was the norm, and extraordinary justification had to be shown for
deviating from that norm. Initially, the extraordinary justification
was often found in the nature of the endeavor. State legislators
were more willing to create corporations to insulate shareholders
from personal liability for projects that were perceived to be par-
ticularly beneficial to the common weal, such as the construction of
roads, bridges and barge canals.
Venture capitalists pressed their case. Here we are, they said,
not only in a new land, at least new to us, but also in the middle of
what years from now will be called the industrial revolution. Is it
not desirable to have people place capital in these new, American
enterprises? If so, it must be recognized that the venture capital-
ists will want a share in profits, but not at the risk of being deemed
partners and held unlimitedly liable for all the claims that might
arise from unprecedented undertakings. The arguments bore fruit
in 1822, decades before any state was willing to pass a general in-
corporation act, when New York and Connecticut passed this
country's first limited partnership statutes.
Based on the French Societe en Commandite, the limited part-
nership acts generally authorized the creation of partnerships with
two classes of "partners," general and limited.2 1 2 This basic ap-
proach is similar to that utilized today. General partners are what
we normally think of as partners, persons with full and equal
power to run the business who are unlimitedly personally liable to
the contract and tort creditors of the business. Limited partners,
on the other hand, were passive investors who could lose their pro-
tected status as limited partners if they took part in the control of
211. See generally J. HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION (1970).
212. See generally H. REUSCHLEIN & W. GREGORY, AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP 433-38
(1979).
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the business. In short, if the limited partners were truly passive
investors, and if they followed a statutorily prescribed procedure
for publicly recording their status as passive investors, they would
be insulated from personal liability to the creditors of the
partnership.21
Limited partnership statutes spread, and limited partnerships
became quite popular. However, by the late nineteenth century, in-
terest in limited partnerships began to fade as the corporate form
became more freely available. State legislatures had been passing,
and then liberalizing, general incorporation acts. Initially, for ex-
ample, it was common for state statutes to limit how long a corpo-
rate charter could last. Like today's so-called "sunset" legislation,
corporate charters were created to expire, for example, after 20
years; only in time would perpetual corporations become accept-
able. There were also limits on the amount of capital any particu-
lar corporation could have because the fear of unlimited accumula-
tions of wealth lingered. Over time various restrictions were
gradually, then rapidly liberalized, as some states actually com-
peted with each other for success in what came to be perceived as
the lucrative business of selling corporate charters.214
The limited partnership had not completely disappeared from
the economic scene by the beginning of the twentieth century. It
still had its uses, and that of Andrew Carnegie is one of the more
notable.2"' It is not entirely fortuitous that when general incorpo-
ration statutes were finally enacted, the corporation, at least at one
level, appeared less regal and more "American." Indeed, the corpo-
rate structure looked very much like the American government.
There were the shareholders, the people, who had the right to vote
to elect a board of directors,216 a Congress, to make basic policy
decisions. The board of directors, in turn, appointed management
to carry out its basic policy mandates. Andrew Carnegie considered
this model of the corporation an unwanted extension of democracy.
He was an extraordinarily successful capitalist who felt that any
investor participating in the profitability of his enterprise should
be grateful for his profits and not meddle in management, by vot-
ing or otherwise. Carnegie did not want to be hampered by minor-
213. See infra section VI B, 1.
214. One of the most famous statements of the evolution of state corporation law is con-
tained in Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 548 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
215. See J. HURST, supra n.211, at 74.
216. Today's general incorporation acts typically authorize the issuance of non-voting
common stock. See Model Business Corporation Act Ann. 2d § 15 (1971).
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ity shareholders, so he held Carnegie Steel in a limited partner-
ship. The state statute authorizing the creation of limited
partnerships was attractive precisely because it said that limited
partners are not to take part in the control of the business. Andrew
Carnegie notwithstanding, the limited partnership form lay fairly
dormant until the middle of the twentieth century when, for rea-
sons of federal income tax law rather than state law, it exploded
into popular usage and came to be a household word in middle and
upper class America.
B. The Uniform Limited Partnership Act
It was in this period of relative dormancy of the limited partner-
ship that the U.L.P.A. was drafted. The National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State laws approved the Uniform Part-
nership Act in 1914 and the U.L.P.A. in 1916. The U.P.A. applies
not only to general partnerships, but also to limited partnerships
''except in so far as the statutes relating to such partnerships are
inconsistent" with the U.P.A. The oU.L.P.A., therefore, can be seen
as a supplement to the U.P.A. and as such it might be expected to
be brief. Nevertheless, the U.L.P.A. is striking both in terms of the
skimpiness of its provisions and the minimal nature of its Official
Comments. Most simply, because of the dramatically increased
availability of the corporate form, the U.L.P.A. was drafted at a
time when it was not considered a particularly important form of
business organization. Decades later, the emergence of publicly-
syndicated limited partnerships created a demand for a Revised
Uniform Limited Partnership Act, which was approved by the Na-
tional Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in
1976.
1. Basic Purpose of U.L.P.A.
What little Official Comment there is makes clear that the basic
purpose of the U.L.P.A. was to enlarge the category of limited
partners who are to be insulated from personal liability. The Offi-
cial Comment sets out three basic classes of supplied capital: one,
the loan on interest; two, the loan in which the lender, in lieu of
interest, takes a share in the profits of the business; three, situa-
tions in which the person advancing the capital secures, besides a
share in the profits, some measure of control over the business.
The early limited partnership acts were adopted at a time when it
was generally held that any interest in the profits of a business
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should make the person holding that interest liable for its obliga-
tions.2 17 Accordingly, in interpreting the original acts the courts as-
sumed two principles as fundamental:
First: That a limited (or as he is also called a special) partner
is a partner in all respects like any other partner, except that to
obtain the privilege of a limitation on his liability, he has con-
formed to the statutory requirements in respect to filing a certifi-
cate and refraining from participating in the conduct of business.
Second: The limited partner, on any failure to follow the re-
quirements in regard to the certificate or any participation in the
conduct of his business, loses his privilege of limited liability and
becomes, as far as those dealing with the business are concerned,
in all respects a partner."'8
These interpretative assumptions accurately reflected the intent
behind the original statutes.2 19 But the law of inadvertent partner-
ship had changed since the original limited partnership statutes
were enacted. By the time the U.L.P.A. was being drafted, a man
could "lend money to a partnership and take a share in the profits
in lieu of interest without running serious danger of being bound
for partnership obligations," and this development had, to a very
great extent, "deprived the existing statutory provisions for limited
partners of any practical usefulness. Indeed, apparently their use is
largely confined to associations in which those who conduct the
business have not more than one limited partner."220 Accordingly,
the drafters of the U.L.P.A. scrapped the underlying assumptions
of earlier limited partnership acts and sought to secure protection
for the only category of capital supplier that still needed protec-
217. U.L.P.A. § 1, Official Comment, 6 U.L.A. at 562-63:
At first, in the absence of statutes the courts, both in this country and in Eng-
land, assumed that one who is interested in a business is bound by its obligations,
carrying the application of this principle so far, that a contract where the only
evidence of interest was a share in the profits made one who supposed himself a
lender, and who was probably unknown to the creditors at the time they extended
their credits, unlimitedly liable as a partner for the obligations of those actually
conducting the business.
218. Id. at 563.
219. Id. at 563.
This is shown by the very wording of the statutes themselves. For instance, all the
statutes [prior to the U.L.P.A.] require that all partners, limited and general, shall
sign the certificate and nearly all state that: "If any false statement be made in
such certificate all the persons interested in such partnership shall be liable for all
the engagements thereof as general partners."
220. Id. at 563-64.
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tion: those who obtain, in addition to a share in the profits, some
measure of control over the business.
The U.L.P.A. replaced the assumptions of prior law with two
boldly different ones:
First: No public policy requires a person who contributes to
the capital of a business, acquires an interest in the profits, and
some degree of control over the conduct of the business, to be-
come bound for the obligations of the business; provided creditors
have no reason to believe at the times their credits were extended
that such person was so bound.
Second: That persons in business should be able, while re-
maining themselves liable without limit for the obligations con-
tracted in its conduct, to associate with themselves others who
contribute to the capital and acquire rights of ownership, pro-
vided that such contributors do not compete with creditors for
the assets of the partnership.'
The U.L.P.A. Official Comment, which is so brief it doesn't say
much, does make one fundamental point repeatedly: henceforth, a
limited partner, "though in accordance with custom called a lim-
ited partner, is not in any sense a partner. He is, however, a mem-
ber of the association. '222
2. Formation of Limited Partnership
The U.L.P.A. defines a limited partnership as "a partnership
formed by two or more persons under the provisions of Section 2,
having as members one or more general partners and one or more
limited partners. The limited partners as such shall not be bound
by the obligations of the partnership. 2 2 3 Section 2 provides for the
execution and recordation of a certificate that states, inter alia, the
names and places of residence of the general and limited partners,
the agreed-upon contributions of the limited partners, the time
when limited partner contributions are to be returned, the share of
profits or other compensation by way of income which each limited
partner shall receive, and the right, if any, of the partners to admit
additional limited partners.2 4 In short, the certificate requires dis-
221. Id. at 564.
222. Id. at 564 (emphasis added). See Bassan v. Investment Exchange Corp., 524 P.2d
233 (Wash. 1974),in which a general partner was held to a strict standard of fiduciary duty
to limited partners.
223. U.L.P.A. § 1, 6 U.L.A. at 562.
224. See U.L.P.A. § 2(1)(a), 6 U.L.A. at 568, for the list of items required to be included
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closure of who the general and limited partners are and might be,
what the limited partners invest, and what the limited partners are
promised in return.
A limited partnership "is formed if there has been substantial
compliance in good faith" with the requirement to record the de-
scribed certificate. 2 5 The drafters clearly intended that a limited
partner, who, in their eyes, "is not in any sense a partner, '22 6
should not be automatically converted into a general partner be-
cause of a failure to strictly comply with the certificate filing
requirements:
As limited partners are not partners securing limited liability
by filing a certificate, the association is formed when substantial
compliance, in good faith, is had with the requirements for a cer-
tificate (Sec. 2(2)). This provision eliminates the difficulties which
arise from the recognition of de facto associations, made neces-
sary by the assumption that the association is not formed unless a
strict compliance with the requirements of the act is had.227
Perhaps because the drafters clearly intended that limited part-
ners not be liable as general partners simply for failure to file a
certificate, some courts have followed the basic purpose of the stat-
ute and held that a limited partnership has been formed notwith-
standing a failure to file.228 Indeed, even a failure to file that re-
sults in non-formation of the limited partnership does not
automatically make the would-be limited partner liable as a gen-
eral partner.2 29
3. Failure to Record Certificate
At first blush, it might seem difficult to conclude that a limited
partnership has been formed if no certificate has been filed. Stated
differently, how can there be "substantial compliance in good
faith" with the filing requirements of the U.L.P.A. if nothing is
filed? There are two basic issues that are interrelated but must be
in the certificate of limited partnership.
225. U.L.P.A. § 2(2), 6 U.L.A. at 568.
226. See infra section VI B, 1.
227. U.L.P.A. § 1, Official Comment, 6 U.L.A. at 564.
228. See, e.g., Garrett v. Koepke, 569 S.W.2d 568 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978). This approach
has also been adopted for tax purposes. In Laney v. Commissioner, 674 F.2d 342 (5th Cir.
1982), the court held that a limited partnership was formed even though no certificate was
filed. But see Heritage Hills v. Zion's First Nat'l. Bank, 601 F.2d 1023 (9th Cir. 1979).
229. See infra section VI B, 3.
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distinguished. One, has a limited partnership been formed not-
withstanding the failure to file? Two, if a limited partnership has
not been formed, are the limited partners liable as general
partners?13 0
With respect to the first issue, the courts appear to be divided.
Some apparently assume that no limited partnership can exist un-
til a certificate is filed.23' Others have emphasized that the
U.L.P.A. does not state precisely when a certificate must be filed or
when in relation to its filing the limited partnership begins,32 or
have emphasized the lack of creditor reliance. One refreshing opin-
ion said that the purpose of filing is simply to provide notice, and
if creditors have notice that they are dealing with a limited part-
nership, they cannot rely on the fortuity of a failure to file to
achieve a windfall.2 3
With respect to the second issue, some courts seem to assume
that if no limited partnership has been formed, the would-be lim-
ited partners automatically become general partners.2 34 This is
clearly an incorrect assumption. The drafters of the U.L.P.A.
stated very directly: "The limited partner not being in any sense a
principal in the business, failure to comply with the requirements
of the act in respect to the certificate, while it may result in the
nonformation of the association, does not make him a partner or
liable as such. ' 23 5 Thus, the would-be limited partner whose certifi-
cate has not been filed must fall within the usual definition of
"partner" before he can be burdened with personal liability.23 e
Moreover, U.L.P.A. section 11 addresses the situation in which the
failure to file results in nonformation of a limited partnership:
230. Another basic question that could be raised is whether the "substantial compli-
ance" test is to be applied at the partnership level or at the level of each individual partner.
What, for example, if counsel for a limited partner was incorrectly told by counsel for a
promoter-general partner that a certificate had been filed? Cf. Franklin v. Rigg, 237 S.E.2d
526, 528 (Ga. App. 1977), which emphasized that "the general tenor of the [U.L.P.A.] is
remedial and drawn with the purpose of protecting investors where there is a substantial
compliance on their part."
231. See, e.g., Dwinell's Central Neon v. Cosmopolitan Chinook Hotel, 587 P.2d 191
(Wash. App. 1978).
232. In Franklin, 237 S.E.2d at 527, the court said the U.L.P.A. "is admittedly vague as
to the time when the existence of the partnership commences."
233. Garrett v. Koepke, 569 S.W.2d 568, 570-71 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978): "We hold, there-
fore, that where a party has knowledge that the entity with which he is dealing is a limited
partnership, that status is not changed by failing to file."
234. See, e.g., Dwinell's Central Neon, 587 P.2d 191.
235. U.L.P.A. § 1, Official Comment, 6 U.L.A. at 564.
236. See infra section II D.
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A person who has contributed to the capital of a business con-
ducted by a person or partnership erroneously believing that he
has become a limited partner in a limited partnership, is not, by
reason of his exercise of the rights of a limited partner, a general
partner with the person or in the partnership carrying on the bus-
iness, or bound by the obligations of such person or partnership;
provided that on ascertaining the mistake he promptly renounces
his interest in the profits of the business, or other compensation
by way of income.2 37
The Supreme Court has said that this section is "broad and highly
remedial" and that the existence of a partnership - limited or
general - is not essential in order that it apply.238 At least one
case has held that a return of profits previously received is not re-
quired; it is sufficient to renounce the right to receive profits in the
future.239
4. The "Control" Limitation
U.L.P.A. section 7 provides: "A limited partner shall not become
liable as a general partner unless, in addition to the exercise of his
rights and powers as a limited partner, he takes part in the control
of the business. "240 There are two basic questions presented by this
section. First, what constitutes "control" within the meaning of
this section? It should be emphasized that it was anticipated by
the drafters that limited partners take "some degree of control
over the conduct of the business. "241 Second, what are the conse-
quences if a prohibited amount of control is exercised by a limited
partner? It should be noted that many have stated that limited
partners are automatically liable as general partners if they take
part in the control of the business. That is not what the statute
says; that would have been an easy thing for the drafters to say,
and that is not what they said. They said that a limited partner
"shall not become liable as a general partner unless . . . he takes
part in the control of the business." That is, the exercise of control
is a minimum requirement before a limited partner will be deemed
a general partner; the statute does not expressly state that the
237. U.L.P.A. § 11, 6 U.L.A. at 594.
238. Giles v. Vette, 263 U.S. 553, 561-63 (1924).
239. Gilman Paint & Varnish Co. v. Legum, 80 A.2d 906 (Md. Ct. App. 1951).
240. U.L.P.A. § 7, 6 U.L.A. at 582. The lack of control in limited partners has led to
detailed regulation of limited partnership interests as securities.
241. See infra section VI B, 1.
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mere exercise of control is sufficient. In short, at least in some ju-
risdictions, there appears to have emerged a reliance requirement
that must be proved before third parties can assert the personal
liability of limited partners who have exercised too much
control.242
Delaney v. Fidelity Lease, Ltd.,43 is a landmark case imposing
personal liability on limited partners on the ground that they exer-
cised control. The plaintiffs leased land to a limited partnership
that had a corporation as its only general partner and twenty-two
individuals as its limited partners. Three of the individual limited
partners were directors, officers and shareholders of the corporate
general partner. The lease was executed by "Fidelity Lease, Ltd., a
limited partnership acting by and through Interlease Corporation,
General Partner, 24 4 thus leaving no suggestion that any of the
limited partners was to be personally liable. Indeed, it is hard to
interpret the lease as anything other than a clear statement that
the limited partners were not to be personally liable. The lease re-
quired the plaintiffs to build a restaurant, which they did, and re-
quired the limited partnership to take possession and pay rent,
which it failed to do.
Liability was clear as to the limited partnership itself and, con-
sequently, as to the corporate general partner. However, it was also
clear that the liability of the partnership and its corporate general
partner were worthless. Initially, the plaintiffs sued all the limited
partners, apparently on the theory that no limited partnership had
been formed because a corporation cannot be the only general
partner in a limited partnership. The U.L.P.A. requires "one or
more general partners and one or more limited partners, 24 5 and
the plaintiffs' position was that a corporation cannot be a "legal
general partner." The action was dropped against the limited part-
ners who were not involved in the general partner and, amazingly,
the court specifically declined to decide whether a corporation can
ever become a "legal general partner. 2 48 The action proceeded,
and was successful, against the three limited partners who were the
242. See Feld, The "Control" Test for Limited Partnerships, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1471
(1969). The imposition of general liability on a limited partner who exercises control may be
prospective from exercise point and not retrospective. That is, he will not necessarily be
held liable as a general partner ab initio. See Garrett, 569 S.W.2d at 568.
243. 526 S.W.2d 543 (Tex. 1975).
244. Id. at 545.
245. U.L.P.A. § 1, 6 U.L.A. at 562.
246. 526 S.W.2d at 546.
1983]
56 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
directors, officers and shareholders of the corporate general part-
ner. The court seemed to focus on them in their capacity as of-
ficers, and concluded both that they had exercised an impermissi-
ble level of control, and that they were accordingly personally
liable.
The case represents an unfortunate windfall for the plaintiffs,
who had not bargained for the personal liability of the limited
partners.24 7 Indeed, it appears that the freedom of the limited
partners from personal liability was at the essence of the bargain
struck. The court repudiated the argument that reliance should be
part of the plaintiffs' case or that lack of reliance should be an
affirmative defense: "The statute makes no mention of any re-
quirement of reliance on the part of the party attempting to hold
the limited partner personally liable. 24 8
Unhampered by any reliance requirement that other courts had
found, the court concluded that the three limited partners were
liable because they had exercised control of the partnership within
the meaning of U.L.P.A. section 7. They had argued that it was
their corporation, not they, who exercised the control, and that the
corporate existene should not be ignored. The court ignored the
existence of the corporation, stating that "courts will disregard the
corporate fiction . . . where it is used to circumvent a statute." In
the case of limited partnerships, "[sitrict compliance with the stat-
ute is required if a limited partner is to avoid liability as a general
partner. 24 '9 The statute requires that there be at least one general
partner. ° If the sole corporate general partner were not ignored,
"the statutory requirement of at least one general partner with
general liability in a limited partnership can be circumvented or
vitiated by limited partners operating the partnership through a
247. Compare the better-reasoned opinion of the court below:
The logical reason to hold a limited partner to general liability under the control
prohibition. is to prevent third parties from mistakenly assuming that the lim-
ited partner is a general partner and to rely on his general liability. However, it is
hard to believe that a creditor would be deceived where he knowingly deals with a
general partner which is a corporation. That in itself is a creature specifically de-
vised to limit liability. The fact that certain limited partners are shareholders,
directors or officers of the corporation is beside the point where the creditor is not
deceived.
Delaney v. Fidelity Lease Ltd., 517 S.W.2d 420, 425 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974).
248. 526 S.W.2d at 545.
249. 526 S.W.2d at 546. Compare U.L.P.A. § 28(1), 6 U.L.A. at 617: "The rule that stat-
utes in derogation of the common law are to be strictly construed shall have no application
to this act."
250. U.L.P.A. § 1, 6 U.L.A. at 562.
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corporation with minimum capitalization and therefore minimum
liability."2 '
A different result was reached under a remarkably similar set of
facts in Frigidaire Sales Corp. v. Union Properties, Inc. 252 The
plaintiff in Frigidaire sued two limited partners who were also di-
rectors, officers and shareholders of the corporation that was the
only general partner of a limited partnership that had breached its
contract with plaintiff. It was accepted as a matter of fact that the
two limited partners "controlled [the corporate general partner]
and through their control of [the corporate general partner] they
exercised the day-to-day control and management of [the limited
partnership]. '"253 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court of Washington
held that the two limited partners were not personally liable.
The court first made clear that it is permissible in Washington
to have a limited partnership with a corporation as the sole general
partner. The U.P.A., which applies to limited partnerships absent
express provision to the contrary,254 expressly provides that a cor-
poration is a "person" who may become a partner.255 Because there
is no express provision to the contrary, corporations may also be
partners in limited partnerships. This conclusion was reinforced by
an amendment to the Washington limited partnership act that an-
ticipated a vote by the limited partners on the "transfer of a ma-
jority of the voting stock of a corporate general partner." 56 The
court distinguished Delaney on the ground that the corporation
and the limited partnership were set up contemporaneously, and
the sole purpose of the corporation was to operate the limited part-
nership. The Delaney court was concerned that the limited part-
ners who controlled the corporation were obligated to operate the
corporation for the benefit of the partnership.
This is not the case here. The pattern of operation of [the corpo-
ration that was the only general partner of the limited partner-
ship in question] was to investigate and conceive of real estate
investment opportunities and, when it found such opportunities,
to cause the creation of limited partnerships with [itself] acting as
the general partner. [The limited partnership in question] was
251. 526 S.W.2d at 546.
252. 562 P.2d 244 (Wash. 1977).
253. Id. at 245.
254. U.P.A. § 6(2), 6 U.L.A. at 22.
255. U.P.A. § 2, 6 U.L.A. at 12.
256. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 25.08.070(2)(a) (Supp. 1982). Compare Revised Uniform
Limited Partnership Act § 303(b), infra section VI C, 4.
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only one of several limited partnerships so conceived and created.
[The two limited partners] did not form [the corporate general
partner] for the sole purpose of operating [the one limited part-
nership in question]. Hence, their acts on behalf of [the corpora-
tion] were not performed merely for the benefit of [the one lim-
ited partnership]. " '
Despite this attempt to distinguish Delaney on its facts, it was
clear that the Supreme Court of Washington differed in its basic
approach to the issue. Whereas Delaney sought to give substance
to the requirement of one general partner by insisting that there
be meaningful personal liability, the Frigidaire court felt that the
concern with minimum capitalization may arise anytime a creditor
deals with a corporation. Given that a corporation may be the sole
general partner, "this concern about minimum capitalization,
standing by itself, does not justify a finding that the limited part-
ners incur general liability for their control of the corporate gen-
eral partner. ' '*8 The court said that if a corporate general partner
is inadequately capitalized, creditors are protected under the
"piercing-the-corporate-veil" doctrine of corporate law. However,
when the limited partners control the corporation only in their ca-
pacities as agents for it, and no creditors are misled into thinking
they are acting on their own behalf, the Frigidaire court will re-
spect the separate corporate existence and refuse to impose per-
sonal liability on the limited partners.2 "
257. 562 P.2d at 246. The dissent more directly rejected the reasoning of the Texas court
that,
because the limited partners acted as officers of the corporate general partner,
they "were obligated to their other partners to so operate the corporation as to
benefit the partnership." 517 S.W.2d at 426. We find no inherent wrong in this.
Persons in the position of the individual defendants in this case would be bound
to act in the best interests of both the corporate general partner and the limited
partners under the guidelines of RCW 25.08.120. The dual capacities are not inim-
ical as asserted.
Frigidaire Sales Corp. v. Union Properties, Inc., 544 P.2d 781, 784 (Wash. Ct. App. 1976).
258. 562 P.2d at 246. 1
259. A somewhat different approach was taken in Mursor Builders, Inc. v. Crown Moun-
tain Apartment Assocs., 467 F. Supp. 1316 (V.I. 1978). The court noted the "literal" ap-
proach of Delaney that focused on "control" and seemed to indicate sympathy for the
Frigidaire approach that considered "creditor reliance."
However, third party reliance is not the sole criterion. Some meaning must be
given to the language embodied in [the control limitation). I do not hold that
merely by acting as officers of a corporate general partner, limited partners be-
come subject to general liability. Rather, I hold that where, as herein, the corpo-
rate officers co-mingle partnership funds with personal funds, fall to maintain
complete corporate and partnership financial records, utilize corporate and part-
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C. The Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act
By the 1970's, the limited partnership had become a well-estab-
lished and extremely popular form of business organization. It of-
fered limited partners the freedom from personal liability which a
shareholder enjoys and tax treatment as members of a partnership.
The new popularity of the limited partnership, particularly as a
vehicle for delivering "tax shelter" to investors, created pressure
for revision of the barebones U.L.P.A. Accordingly, a Revised Uni-
form Limited Partnership Act (Revised Act) was adopted by the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in
1976.260 The Revised Act is a more detailed statute than the
U.L.P.A., and was intended both to clarify prior law and to make
certain important substantive changes.
1. Formation and Failure to File
The Revised Act provides: "In order to form a limited partner-
ship two or more persons must execute a certificate of limited part-
nership. '2 6  The Revised Act certificate must set forth essentially
the same kind of information as under the U.L.P.A. The certificate
is intended to serve two basic functions: first, to place creditors on
notice of the facts concerning the capital of the partnership and
the rules regarding additional contributions to and withdrawals
from the partnership; second, to clearly delineate the time at
which persons become general partners and limited partners. The
Revised Act provides that the certificate shall be filed in the office
of the Secretary of the State and that:
A limited partnership is formed at the time of the filing of the
certificate of limited partnership in the office of the Secretary of
State or at any later time specified in the certificate of limited
partnership if, in either case, there has been substantial compli-
ance with the requirements of this section.2"
nership funds for their personal enjoyment, and fail to maintain their corporate
officer identity in conducting partnership affairs, said limited partners become
generally liable for the debts of the partnership irrespective of third party creditor
reliance.
Id. at 1333-34.
260. Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act, 6 U.L.A. 159 (1982 Supp.) [hereinafter
R.U.L.P.A.]. See generally Kessler, The New Uniform Limited Partnership Act: A Cri-
tique, 48 FORD. L. REV. 159 (1979).
261. R.U.L.P.A. § 201(a), 6 U.L.A. at 168.
262. Id. § 201(b) at 168.
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The Revised Act appears to make it more difficult to argue that a
limited partnership has been formed notwithstanding the failure to
file a certificate. The Revised Act, unlike the U.L.P.A., specifies
that a limited partnership is formed "at the time of the filing of
the certificate of limited partnership." On the other hand, the
Commissioners' Comment to the formation section states that it is
based upon prior law.268 Furthermore, the language that "[in or-
der to form a limited partnership two or more persons must exe-
cute a certificate" suggests that it is the execution of the certifi-
cate, and not the recording of the certificate that is the minimal
necessary act. Similarly, the Commissioners' Prefatory Note states
that the certificate of limited partnership "is a statutory prerequi-
site to creation of the limited partnership;" it does not specify that
the statutory prerequisite is the filing of the certificate. Finally,
the Revised Act defines the term "limited partner" to mean "a
person who has been admitted to a limited partnership as a limited
partner in accordance with the partnership agreement and named
in the certificate of limited partnership as a limited partner."2 5
Once again, there is no mention of the filing of the certificate. The
Commissioners' Comment to this definition contains the following
statement: "[T]he definition makes it clear that being named in
the certificate of limited partnership is a prerequisite to limited
partner status. Failure to file does not, however, mean that the
participant is a general partner or that he has general liability. '"2
This language, although ambiguous, arguably suggests that a per-
son can become a limited partner by being named in the certificate
even if the certificate is not filed. On the other hand, it may simply
mean that an investor is not automatically liable as a general part-
ner merely because failure to file has resulted in nonformation of a
limited partnership. 2 7 The section that deals with people who mis-
takenly believe they are limited partners also indicates that liabil-
ity as a general partner does not automatically follow from a fail-
263. Id. § 201, Commissioners' Comment, at 169. See section VI B, 3, supra, for conflict-
ing authority under the U.L.P.A.
264. Id. Commissioners' Prefatory Note at 159.
265. Id. § 101(6) at 163.
266. Id. Commissioners' Comment at 164.
267. See B. Lane & D. Falk, Limited Partnerships: Legal and Business Aspects of Orga-
nizations, Operation and Dissolution, 24 CoIRoATE PRACTIcE SERIEs 12 (BNA 1981):
"Under the Revised ULPA, recording a certificate is an absolute prerequisite to limited
partnership status, for as the Commissioners' Comment states, one of the purposes of the
recording requirement is to clearly delineate the time at which persons become general part-
ners and limited partners."
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ure to file.' 5
2. Person Erroneously Believing Himself a Limited Partner
The Revised Act provisions concerning people who erroneously
believe that they are limited partners are only slightly different
from those under the U.L.P.A.
§304. [Person Erroneously Believing Himself Limited Partner]
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b), a person who makes a
contribution to a business enterprise and erroneously but in good
faith believes that he has become a limited partner in the enter-
prise is not a general partner in the enterprise and is not bound
by its obligations by reason of making the contribution, receiving
distributions from the enterprise, or exercising any rights of a
limited partner, if, on ascertaining the mistake, he:
(1) causes an appropriate certificate of limited
partnership or a certificate of amendment to be exe-
cuted and filed; or
(2) withdraws from future equity participation in
the enterprise.
(b) A person who makes a contribution of the kind described in
subsection (a) is liable as a general partner to any third party who
transacts business with the enterprise (i) before the person with-
draws and an appropriate certificate is filed to show withdrawal,
or (ii) before an appropriate certificate is filed to show his status
as a limited partner and, in the case of an amendment, after expi-
ration of the 30-day period for filing an amendment relating to
the person as a limited partner under Section 202, but in either
case only if the third party actually believed in good faith that
the person was a general partner at the time of the
transaction.'"
This section is derived from U.L.P.A. section 11. The "good faith"
requirement in the first sentence of section 304(a) is new. Subsec-
tion (a)(2) "was intended to clarify an ambiguity in the prior law
by providing that a person who chooses to withdraw from the en-
terprise in order to protect himself from liability is not required to
renounce any of his then current interest in the enterprise so long
as he has no further participation as an equity participant.' 7 0 Par-
268. Id. § 304 at 175-76.
269. Id. § 304 at 175-76 (emphasis added).
270. Id. § 304, Commissioners' Comment at 176. It is not clear what the distinction is
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agraph (b) "preserves the liability of the equity participant prior to
withdrawal (and after the time for appropriate amendment in the
case of a limited partnership) to any third party who has trans-
acted business with the person believing in good faith that he was
a general partner."2"
3. Limited Partners Can Contribute Services
One of the most significant changes made by the Revised Act is
that limited partners may now contribute services for their part-
nership interests. Under the U.L.P.A., "[t]he contributions of a
limited partner may be cash or other property, but not services.
'27 2
Under the Revised Act, a limited partner may receive an interest
not only for services performed, but for a promise to perform ser-
vices in the future: "The contribution of a partner may be in cash,
property, or services rendered, or a promissory note or other obli-
gation to contribute cash or property or to perform services. ' 27 3 A
description and statement of the agreed value of the services con-
tributed by each partner and which each partner has promised to
contribute in the future must be included in the certificate of lim-
ited partnership.27 4 In the case of a promise to perform services,
the value stated in the certificate may determine the liability of a
partner who fails to honor his agreement:
Except as provided in the certificate of limited partnership, a
partner is obligated to the limited partnership to perform any
promise . . . to perform services, even if he is unable to perform
because of death, disability or any other reason. If a partner does
not make the required contribution of .. .services, he is obli-
gated at the option of the limited partnership to contribute cash
equal to that portion of the value (as stated in the certificate of
limited partnership) of the stated contribution that has not been
made.278
between his "then current interest in the enterprise" and "further participation as an equity
participant."
271. Id.
272. U.L.P.A. § 4, 6 U.L.A. 561, 579.
273. R.U.L.P.A. § 501, 6 U.L.A. at 179 (1982 Supp.). See also § 101(2), at 163: "'Contri-
bution' means any cash, property, services rendered, or a promissory note or other binding
obligation to contribute cash or property or to perform services, which a partner contributes
to a limited partnership in his capacity as a partner."
274. Id. § 201(a)(5) at 168.
275. Id. § 502(a) at 179-80.
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Furthermore, if the partnership agreement fails to provide how
profits and losses and distributions are to be allocated among the
partners, they will be allocated on the basis of the value stated in
the certificate of the contributions made by each partner to the
extent they have been received by the partnership and have not
been returned.
4. The "Control" Limitation
Uncertainty about the "control" limitation under U.L.P.A. sec-
tion 7 has been viewed as one of the major disadvantages of doing
business in the limited partnership form. The Revised Act begins
with a basic statement of the control limitation that is very much
like U.L.P.A. section 7:
Except as provided in subsection (d) [dealing with the im-
proper use of a limited partner's name in the partnership name],
a limited partner is not liable for the obligations of a limited part-
nership unless he is also a general partner or, in addition to the
exercise of his rights and powers as a limited partner, he takes
part in the control of the business.6
This language was intended "to insure that judicial decisions
under the prior uniform law remain applicable to the extent not
expressly changed." ' The Revised Act then continues with a
much more extensive treatment of the control limitation than
under the U.L.P.A. First, the Revised Act provides that "if the
limited partner's participation in the control of the business is not
substantially the same as the exercise of the powers of a general
partner, he is liable only to persons who transact business with the
limited partnership with actual knowledge of his participation in
control. 2 78 Because of the difficulty in determining when the "con-
trol" limitation is violated, the drafters thought it was unfair to
impose general partner's liability on a limited partner except to
the extent that a third party had knowledge of his participation in
control. On the other hand, the "is not substantially the same as"
test was introduced "in order to avoid permitting a limited partner
to exercise all of the powers of a general partner while avoiding
any direct dealings with third parties. '27 9
276. Id. § 303(a) at 174.
277. Id. § 303, Commissioners' Comment at 175.
278. Id. § 303(a) at 174.
279. Id. § 303, Commissioners' Comment at 175.
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Second, the R.U.L.P.A. provides a "safe harbor" by listing cer-
tain activities that a limited partner may carry on for the partner-
ship without being deemed to have taken part in the control of the
business. A limited partner does not participate in the control of
the business solely by being a contractor for or an agent or em-
ployee of the limited partnership or of a general partner, consult-
ing with or advising a general partner with respect to the business
of the limited partnership, acting as a surety for the limited part-
nership, or approving or disapproving an amendment to the part-
nership agreement. In addition, a limited partner does not take
part in control solely by voting on one or more of the following
matters:
(i) the dissolution and winding up of the limited
partnership;
(ii) the sale, exchange, lease, mortgage, pledge or other trans-
fer of all or substantially all of the assets of the limited partner-
ship other than in the ordinary course of its business;
(iii) the incurrence of indebtedness by the limited partnership
other than in the ordinary course of its business;
(iv) a change in the nature of the business; or
(v) the removal of a general partner. 80
This list of "safe" activities is not intended to be exclusive. 81 As
will be discussed below, the addition of so-called "democracy
rights" for limited partners may make a limited partnership look
more like a corporation than a partnership for federal income tax
purposes.
VII. TAX CLASSIFICATION OF LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS
A. Short Summary
The category of partnership for federal income tax purposes is
broader than the category of partnership under state law. Recall
that "partnership" is a residual category: it includes any business
group or venture that is not a corporation or a trust or estate.82
Recall, also, that the limited partnership began as a corporate an-
tecedent to offer venture capitalists shareholder-type freedom from
personal liability. Given that a corporation can be a general part-
280. Id. § 303(b) at 174-75.
281. Id. § 303(c) at 175.
282. I.R.C. §§ 761(a), 7701(a)(2) (1982). See infra section III A-B.
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ner,258 the question arises: how is a limited partnership, particu-
larly a limited partnership that has no other general partner than a
corporation, classified for tax purposes? Is the corporate antece-
dent with a sole corporate general partner not a corporation for tax
purposes? If it is not, then it falls within the residual category of
tax partnership.
The short and, to many practitioners, the sweet of it is that,
under the present classification regulations, as interpreted by a
major Tax Court decision in which the Service has indicated its
acquiescence, it appears virtually impossible for any U.L.P.A. lim-
ited partnership, including one that has a sole corporate general
partner, to be treated as anything other than a partnership for tax
purposes.2 4 The relevant regulations were drafted at a time when
the Treasury resisted efforts by certain unincorporated profes-
sional associations to be classified as corporations for tax purposes.
Although unincorporated, these associations were structured and
documented in an attempt to make them look as much like corpo-
rations as possible. The goal was to have the organizations classi-
fied as corporations for tax purposes to permit them to deduct out-
lays for various fringe and retirement benefits. The Treasury
resisted these efforts by drafting regulations that made it virtually
impossible for these organizations to achieve corporate classifica-
tion. The regulations narrow the definition of a corporation for tax
purposes and open wide the residual category of partnership, mak-
ing it virtually impossible for any Uniform Act general or limited
partnership to ever be classified as anything other than a partner-
ship for federal income tax purposes. There are two basic features
of the regulations that reflect the strong bias toward partnership
classification. First, they identify four characteristics that tend to
be found in a "pure corporation" and state that three of the four
must be found before an organization will be classified as a corpo-
ration. This "numerical supremacy test" provides that, if only two
of these characteristics are present, partnership classification re-
sults. Second, the regulations define these characteristics in bizarre
283. See infra section VI B, 4 for unusual equivocation on this point in Texas.
284. Regulations under the Revenue Act of 1916 first took the position that all limited
partnerships were taxable as corporations. Reg. 33, Art. 62. However, these regulations were
soon replaced by regulations that applied a "resemblance" test. Reg. 45, Arts. 1505, 1506
(1918). For a history of the classification question, see Sexton & Osteen, Classification as a
Partnership or an Association Taxable as a Corporation, 24 TUL. TAX INST. 95 (1975).
Compare Heritage Hills v. Zion's First National Bank, 601 F.2d 1023 (9th Cir. 1979), in
which it was held that a limited partnership composed entirely of corporations was not a
corporation for purposes of Chapter 12 of the Bankruptcy Act.
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ways. The bizarre definitions are biased toward making it virtually
impossible for more than two of these characteristics to ever be
found in any U.P.A. general partnership or any U.L.P.A. limited
partnership. The Treasury drafted a regulation that was a weapon
against the professional association. Once that weapon was on the
books, it attracted the attention of people who wanted to market
tax shelters to high-bracket investors. Tentatively at first, they
dusted off old books on limited partnerships and began using them
as devices to "pass through" losses to passive investors, investors
with no personal liability. The private sector, particularly the real
estate industry, became delighted with the Treasury's weapon. The
limited partnership was "born again" and rapidly achieved unprec-
edented prominence.
Larson v. Commissioner,285 is the major Tax Court decision that
allows taxpayers to rely on the Treasury's regulations to achieve
partnership classification for limited partnerships, including those
with sole corporate general partners. Before discussing the regula-
tions, which will be done in the context of Larson, two pre-Larson
Revenue Procedures will be discussed. Each sets out conditions
that must be present before the Service will give an advance ruling
on the tax classification of a limited partnership. It would seem,
particularly after Larson, that their conditions should not be
viewed as substantive requirements. However, the Service contin-
ues to issue private letter rulings that purport to condition part-
nership classification on compliance with their conditions. In so
doing, the Service seems to be resisting what appears to be the
unavoidable consequence of Larson: that every U.L.P.A. limited
partnership will be classified as a partnership for tax purposes, and
that every limited partner will be a member of the partnership for
tax purposes.
B. Advance Rulings: Revenue Procedure 72-13
In Revenue Procedure 72-13, 286 the Service stated conditions
that must be present before it will issue advance rulings on the tax
classification of limited partnerships that have a corporation as the
sole general partner. First, the limited partners may not own, di-
rectly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, more than
twenty percent of the corporate general partner or any affiliates.
Second, a net worth requirement is imposed upon the corporation.
285. 66 T.C. 159 (1976), acq., 1979-2 C.B. 2.
286. 1972-1 C.B. 735.
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If the corporate general partner has an interest in only one limited
partnership and the total contributions to that partnership are less
than $2,500,000, the net worth of the corporate general partner at
all times must be at least fifteen percent of the total contributions
or $250,000, whichever is less. If the total contributions are
$2,500,000 or more, the net worth of the corporate general partner
at all times must be at least ten percent of the total contributions.
In computing its net worth, the corporate general partner's interest
in the limited partnership and accounts and notes receivable from
and payable to the partnership are excluded. If the corporate gen-
eral partner has interests in more than one limited partnership,
these net worth requirements will be applied separately for each
partnership, and the general partner must at all times have a net
worth at least as great as the sum of the amounts required for each
separate limited partnership. Third, the purchase of a limited
partnership interest by a limited partner cannot entail either a
mandatory or discretionary purchase or option to purchase any
type of security of the corporate general partner or its affiliates.
Although technically only a statement of when advance rulings
would be given, Revenue Procedure 72-13 suggested that the Ser-
vice was going to aggressively challenge the tax classification of
limited partnerships.2 87 Furthermore, in situations in which an ad-
vance ruling was a practical necessity, the requirements had the
same effect as binding rules of law. Many in the tax bar felt that
the requirements were substantively unfounded. 8 Consider, for
example, the net worth requirement for the corporate general part-
ner. Years later, the American Law Institute would report that
Revenue Procedure 72-13's net worth requirement would be a good
way to revise the definition of the corporate characteristic of lim-
ited liability, impliedly rejecting the idea that it is a reasonable
application of the present regulations.289
287. As this article was going to press, the Service announced it will conduct a study of
the rules on tax classification, with special emphasis on the significance of the characteristic
of limited liability. Ann. 83-4, 1983-2 I.R.B. 31 (Jan. 10, 1983), provides, in part:
This study will consider the possible application of the minimum capitalization
requirement of Revenue Procedure 72-13, 1972 C.B. 735, to all entities seeking
classification as partnerships for federal tax purposes. That requirement could be
applied either as an advance ruling policy or as a substantive rule. The study also
will reconsider the IRS' acquiescence in the (sic) Phillip G. Larson, 66 T.C. 159
(1976), acq. 1979-1 C.B. 1, to the extent the acquiescence is inconsistent with that
minimum capitalization requirement.
288. See, e.g., Weiler, Limited Partnerships with Corporate General Partners: Beyond
Rev. Proc. 72-13, 36 J. TAX. 306 (1972).
289. FEDERAL INcOmE TAX PROJECT, 92 (Tent. Draft No. 7, 1981) [hereinafter cited as
1983]
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C. Advance Rulings: Revenue Procedure 74-17
In Revenue Procedure 74-17,110 the Service announced that un-
less the following "operating rules" are complied with, it would
"ordinarily" decline to issue a requested ruling or determination
letter:
.01 The interests of all of the general partners, taken together,
in each material item of partnership income, gain, loss, deduction
or credit is equal to at least one percent of each such item at all
times during the existence of the partnership. In determining the
general partners' interests in such items, limited partnership in-
terests owned by the general partners shall not be taken into
account.
.02 The aggregate deductions to be claimed by the partners as
their distributive shares of partnership losses for the first two
years of operation of the limited partnership will not exceed the
amount of equity capital invested in the partnership.
.03 A creditor who makes a nonrecourse loan to the limited
partnership must not have or acquire, at any time as a result of
making the loan, any direct or indirect interest in the profits, cap-
ital, or property of the limited partnership other than as a se-
cured creditor.2 1
Once again, this revenue procedure was met with criticism from
practitioners as imposing on limited partnerships requirements
that had no foundation in law.292 Indeed, these "operating rules" to
obtain tax classification rulings and determination letters seem to
have little to do with the existing regulations on tax classification.
Instead, they seem aimed at other features of tax shelters the Ser-
vice finds offensive, such as special allocations of deductions and
losses that divert tax benefits from promoters to investors, the use
of nonrecourse loans by promoters that are more properly charac-
terized as contributions to capital, and various techniques for
claiming front-end write-offs and accelerating deductions into the
earlier years of the partnership.293
T.D. No. 7]: "The limited liability characteristic can be revised to provide a substantial net
worth requirement. Section 72-13 provides a reasonable rule for this purpose."
290. 1974-1 C.B. 438.
291. Id. at 439.
292. See, e.g., SPADA & RUGE, supra note 113, at A-33.
293. Rev. Proc. 75-16, 1975-1 C.B. 676, outlines information that is required but fre-
quently omitted in requests for rulings on the tax classification of limited partnerships:
.01 General
1. The name and identification number of the organization.
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D. The Numerical Supremacy Test
If a limited partnership is not an "association" taxable as a cor-
2. A description of the business of the organization.
3. The date and place where the partnership certificate was or will be
filed.
.02 Partnership Agreement
1. The partnership agreement and all amendments to it.
2. A statement whether the State in which the organization is formed
has adopted, as applicable, the Uniform Partnership Act or the Uniform
Limited Partnership Act.
3. A list of all substantial differences between the applicable State Act
and the Uniform Act.
4. A copy of the applicable State partnership acts and all amendments
thereto pursuant to which the organization was or will be formed.
.03 Partnership Certificate.
1. The partnership certificate filed or to be filed with the State in which
the organization is formed.
.04 Registration Statement.
1. The registration statement filed or to be filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission. (A draft is acceptable.)
2. If a registration statement is not required to be filed with the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission, then documents filed or to be filed with any
agency engaged in the regulation of securities, whether Federal or State,
and any private offering memorandum. (Drafts are acceptable.).
3. A description of all arrangements made with regard to the marketing
of interests in the organization, such as arrangements with brokers, under-
writers, and dealers.
.05 Net Worth
1. A representation of the net worth of the general partner(s).
2. Financial data to support the representation including, for example,
audited balance sheets or unaudited balance sheets with a representation
that it is prepared in accordance with generally accepted accounting
principles.
.06 Promotional Material.
1. An outline or a highlighted copy of all promotional material used to
sell interests in the organization, particularly including statements made re-
garding the probable tax consequences of the arrangement and the effect of
the requested ruling upon such tax consequences.
.07 Creditors' Interests.
1. A detailed description of all creditors' interests in the organization or
its assets, other than security interests and rights to repayment.
2. A detailed description of all benefits that creditors may receive, such
as rights of conversion or exchange into any other interest, rights of re-
course against property other than the property being developed with the
loan proceeds, or benefits that accrue to neighboring property owned by
creditors because of the loan of money to the organization.
.08 Capital Contribution.
1. A statement indicating the amount of the capital contribution made
or to be made both by the general partner(s) and the limited partner(s) to
the organization, and, if a general partner is also a limited partner, the ca-
pacity in which the contribution was or will be made.
.09 Profits and Losses.
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poration, it will fall into the residual category of partnership for
tax purposes. The regulations list
a number of major characteristics ordinarily found in a pure cor-
poration which, taken together, distinguish it from other organi-
zations. These are: (i) associates, (ii) an objective to carry on busi-
ness and divide the gains therefrom, (iii) continuity of life, (iv)
centralization of management, (v) liability for corporate debts
limited to corporate property, and (vi) free transferability of
interests.2 4
The regulations also state that, in addition to these "major" fac-
tors, "other factors may be found ... which may be significant in
classifying an organization as an association, a partnership, or a
trust. 29 5 However, there is no indication in the regulations what
these "other factors" might be. After they are vaguely alluded to,
they are apparently dropped from consideration as the regulations
proceed to discuss tax classification of limited partnerships solely
in terms of four factors. Because
associates and an objective to carry on business and divide the
gains therefrom are generally common to 'both corporations and
partnerships, the determination of whether an organization which
has such characteristics is to be treated for tax purposes as a
partnership or as an association depends on whether there exists
[1] centralization of management, [2] continuity of life, [3] free
1. A detailed explanation of the extent of participation of the general
partner(s) and the limited partner(s) in the profits and the losses of the
organization, and if a general partner is also a limited partner, the capacity
in which profits and losses are or will be shared.
2. A statement indicating whether there will be any shift in the propor-
tion of the profit and loss sharing ratio during the course of the operation of
the organization and, if so, the details of the shift and the business reasons
for it.
.10 Negative Capital Accounts.
1. A statement indicating whether the amount of any negative capital
balance on the part of a general partner or a limited partner will be paid by
such partner to the organization upon dissolution, liquidation, or termina-
tion of the organization.
.11 Distribution.
1. A statement describing the manner and method of intended distribu-
tions of assets, including cash, to the partners.
2. A statement describing the distribution scheme of assets upon termii-
nation and/or dissolution of the organization after the payment of debts.
294. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(1) (1977).
295. Id.
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transferability of interests, and [4] limited liability.2"
The regulations purport to cite the Supreme Court's decision in
Morrissey v. Commissioner' with approval as they begin with a
declaration that an organization will be treated as an association if
it "more nearly resembles" a corporation than a partnership.291
Under an "overall resemblance" test, for example, the extent to
which the two particular corporate features were present might
completely overwhelm all other considerations. The "association
regulations," however, also known as the "Kintner "299 regulations,
clearly reject such an approach, and adopt instead a "numerical
supremacy" test: "An unincorporated organization shall not be
classified as an association unless such organization has more cor-
porate characteristics than noncorporate characteristics. '"300 In the
event of a tie, partnership classification results. 01
Larson v. Commissioner,8 2 is the leading case on tax classifica-
tion of limited partnerships, and probably will remain the leading
case as long as the present regulations are in effect. The Tax Court
concluded that there was a two-to-two tie on the four major corpo-
rate characteristics: each of the two limited partnerships involved
was found to have the corporate characteristics of centralized man-
agement and free transferability of interests, as defined in the reg-
ulations, and lacked the corporate characteristics of continuity of
life and limited liability, as defined in the regulations. In the case
of a tie, the Tax Court held, the Service could not classify the lim-
ited partnership as a corporation for tax purposes. Nor would the
court find "other factors" that would tip the balance away from
partnership to corporate classification. In short, Larson confirms
the short-and-sweet interpretation of the association regulations: if
you want your limited partnership taxed as a partnership, simply
assure yourself that any two of the four major corporate character-
istics are eliminated. As we shall see, the bizarre definitions of the
296. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(2) (1977).
297. 296 U.S. 344 (1935).
298. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(1) (1977).
299. United States v. Kintner, 216 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1954.).
300. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(1)(3) (1977).
301. For example, if a limited partnership has centralized management and free
transferability of interests but lacks continuity of life and limited liability, and if
the limited partnership has no other characteristics which are significant in deter-
mining its classification, such limited partnership is not classified as an association
[but as a partnership.]
Id.
302. 66 T.C. 159 (1976), acq., 1979-2 C.B. 2.
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four characteristics appear to make the elimination of least two of
at them relatively easy.
E. The Facts of Larson
The first decision issued by the Tax Court in Larson held that
the two limited partnerships before it were, for federal income tax
purposes, corporations. The result was that the tax losses that had
been claimed by the limited partners belonged, not to them, but to
their corporations. The Tax Court "withdrew" this initial opinion,
and some months later issued Larson v. Commissioner, known af-
fectionately by some as Larson II, which reached the opposite re-
sult and held that both limited partnerships were indeed partner-
ships for tax purposes, that the limited partners were members of
the partnerships for tax purposes, and, hence, that the partner-
ships' tax losses could be passed through to them. The case is sig-
nificant not only for its unusual history, but also for its extensive
discussion of how the association regulations apply to fairly typical
tax shelter limited partnerships.
An examination of one of the two limited partnerships involved
in Larson is sufficient to indicate that the Tax Court had before it
a fairly typical real estate partnership. Mai-Kai was formed in
1968 under California's version of the U.L.P.A. to own and operate
a student apartment complex. Mai-Kai had as its sole general part-
ner a corporation ("GHL") that had been formed to organize "real
estate syndications" as limited partnerships. GHL, which had a
paid-in capital of $21,300 and negligible cash on hand, managed
and administered the properties of both partnerships. Upon the
formation of Mai-Kai, GHL transferred to Mai-Kai, as its contri-
bution to capital, the right to acquire the apartment complex.
GHL neither claimed credit for this contribution of contract rights
nor was required to make any other capital contributions. Accord-
ingly, its total capital contribution was listed and carried on Mai-
Kai's books and records as zero. The limited partnership interests
in Mai-Kai were divided into ten units of $9,500 per unit and sold
to a total of eight limited partners who contributed a total of
$95,000 cash. After its formation, Mai-Kai purchased the apart-
ment complex by giving a $450,000 note and deed of trust for the
full amount of the purchase price. The note was nonrecourse by
virtue of the California Code of Civil Procedure, which provided
that there could be no deficiency judgment upon foreclosure of a
purchase-money mortgage.
The limited partnership agreement provided that the partner-
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ship business would be managed by GHL, which received a
monthly management fee of five percent of gross receipts. GHL
was also given the right to obtain financing or refinancing for the
partnership property and receive mortgage loan fees not to exceed
two percent of the amount of each loan. No limited partner could
withdraw his capital contribution without the consent of GHL, but
could withdraw his "capital account" upon the termination of the
partnership.0 3 The partnership agreement made detailed provision
for the allocation of "profits, losses and distributions." "Profits"
was defined to mean the taxable income of the partnership, which
was to be allocated twenty percent to the general partner and
eighty percent to the limited partners. The agreement's language
on the allocation of losses reflected an ambiguity that is present in
many leveraged partnerships:
All losses of the partnership shall be allocated entirely to the
Limited Partners in proportion to their capital contributions,
subject however to the limitation of liability of each Limited
Partner to the amount of his individual investment in the part-
nership. All losses of the partnership in excess of the total capital
contributions of the Limited Partners shall be borne entirely by
the General Partner.
0 4
The language appears to result from mixed motive. It apparently
intends both to allocate all tax losses to the limited partners 0 5 and
to reiterate their status as limited partners liable only to the extent
of their contribution. It was not intended to mean that they would
only be allocated tax losses up to the amounts of their contribu-
tion. Indeed, by the end of the second year of partnership opera-
tions, the limited partners had been allocated losses in excess of
their cash investment. Cash flow and distributions of proceeds
from any sale of partnership property were to be allocated twenty
percent to the general partner and eighty percent to the limited
partners. The allocations of "profits" (taxable income), cash flow
and distributions were subject to a "payback" priority to the lim-
303. In highly-leveraged limited partnerships, allocation of deductions or losses typically
give the limited partners negative capital accounts within the first few yeari of partnership
operations. The significance of negative capital accounts should be anticipated and provided
for in the partnership agreement. See generally Weidner, Partnership Allocations and Cap-
ital Accounts Analysis, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 467 (1981).
304. 66 T.C. at 164.
305. The Service apparently did not argue that the allocation of all tax losses to the
limited partners ran afoul of section 704(b).
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ited partners: it was agreed that "the General Partner shall not
participate in the cash flow or profits of the project until such time
as a Limited Partner (assuming a 50% tax bracket) has been re-
turned his initial investment through a combination of cash flow
and operating losses. "806
GHL was not to sell or encumber its interest as general partner
or enter into any agreement that would involve anyone else "be-
coming interested with it in the partnership." Limited partners
were not to transfer their right to income without the prior written
consent of the GHL, which could "not unreasonably withhold such
consent." The agreement provided, on the other hand, that, the
"capital interest" of each limited partner was subject to a right of
first refusal in the remaining limited partners if GHL determined
that the price offered by a proposed transferee was less than the
fair market value of the interest. If the remaining limited partners
chose not to exercise that right, the transfer could be effected on
the condition precedent that the transferee sign such documents as
GHL deemed necessary or desirable to effect the admission of the
transferee as a substituted limited partner.
The partnership was to continue for a period of thirty-three
years unless extended for such longer term as might be determined
by the election of limited partners entitled to sixty percent or more
of the profits allocable to the limited partners. The partnership
could terminate sooner upon any of the following events:
(a) A disposition [by] the partnership of its entire interest in
the real property.
(b) .The adjudication of bankruptcy of the General Partner or
otherwise as provided by the Uniform Limited Partnership Act,
unless the business is continued by a General Partner elected in
place thereof.
(c) A determination by the election of Limited Partners enti-
tled to sixty per cent (60%) or more of the profits of the partner-
ship allocable to the Limited Partners that the partnership shall
terminate.
(d) The removal of the General Partner by the vote of Lim-
ited Partners entitled to sixty per cent (60%) or more of the prof-
its of the partnership allocable to the Limited Partners. In such
event, there shall be a distribution of assets * * * unless the Lim-
306. 66 T.C. at 164. Such "payback" periods are common, and have often been inserted
in transactions at the insistence of state securities law commissioners. The basic idea is to
give the general partner incentive to protect the interests of the limited partners by making
sure that he only reaps his profit after they have recovered theirs.
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ited Partners, by an affirmative vote of Limited Partners owning
100% of the profits in the partnership allocable to the Limited
Partners, elect to form a new partnership to continue the partner-
ship business.0 7
Andrew Carnegie presumably would have been horrified by these
last two causes for termination."' 8
F. Continuity of Life
The regulations define the corporate characteristic of continuity
of life in terms of "dissolution" of the partnership:
An organization has continuity of life if the death, insanity,
bankruptcy, retirement, resignation, or expulsion of any member
will not cause a dissolution of the organization. On the other
hand, if the death, insanity, bankruptcy, retirement, resignation,
or expulsion of any member will cause a dissolution of the organi-
zation, continuity of life does not exist.309
Dissolution is in turn defined in terms of a theoretical dissolution
under state law:
[D]issolution of an organization means an alteration of the iden-
tity of an organization by reason of a change in the relationship
between its members as determined under local law. For example,
since the resignation of a partner from a general partnership de-
stroys the mutual agency which exists between such partner and
his copartners and thereby alters the personal relation between
the partners which constitutes the identity of the partnership it-
self, the resignation of a partner dissolves the partnership. 0
This basic definition of dissolution reflects the definition in the
U.P.A., which applies to limited partnerships unless the limited
partnership statute provides to the contrary.3 11 "The dissolution of
a partnership is a change in the relation of the partners caused by
any partner ceasing to be associated in the carrying on as distin-
guished from the winding up of the business."312 The point of dis-
307. 66 T.C. at 165.
308. See infra section VI A.
309. Tress. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)(1) (1977).
310. Tress. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)(2) (1977).
311. U.P.A. § 6(2), 6 U.L.A. at 22. See also R.U.L.P.A. § 1105, 6 U.L.A. at 193 (1982
Supp.).
312. U.P.A. § 29, 6 U.L.A. at 364 (emphasis added).
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solution does not necessarily have any significance under state law.
Dissolution is basically an event that will trigger the process of
"winding up" a partnership, leading to its termination, unless the
partners have agreed that the event will not trigger the winding up
process.313 The U.P.A. provides that dissolution is caused by a va-
riety of events, including the death or bankruptcy of any partner.
Indeed, it provides that dissolution may be caused by the express
will of any partner at any time, even if the partnership agreement
provides to the contrary.""
The regulations state that it does not matter if the partners
draft away the consequences of a technical dissolution, so long as
the technical dissolution takes place:
An agreement by which an organization is established may pro-
vide that the business will be continued by the remaining mem-
bers in the event of the death or withdrawal of any member, but
such agreement does not establish continuity of life if under local
law the death or withdrawal of any member causes a dissolution
of the organization. Thus, there may be a dissolution of the or-
ganization and no continuity of life although the business is con-
tinued by the remaining members. 1
Nor does it matter if the members agree that none of them shall
cause a dissolution of the organization. As just stated, under the
U.P.A., any general partner can dissolve the partnership at will at
any time, even in contravention of the partnership agreement.31 6
Even though the partner who dissolves in contravention of the
agreement has lesser rights than one who dissolves in accordance
with the agreement and can be liable for his breach of the agree-
ment,317 the regulations indicate that this power to dissolve pre-
cludes a finding of the corporate characteristic of continuity of life:
[I]f the agreement provides that the organization is to continue
for a stated period or until the completion of a stated transaction,
the organization has continuity of life if the effect of the agree-
ment is that no member has the power to dissolve the organiza-
tion in contravention of the agreement. Nevertheless, if, notwith-
313. U.P.A. § 30, 6 U.L.A. at 367: "On dissolution the partnership is not terminated, but
continues until the winding up of partnership affairs is completed."
314. U.P.A. § 31, 6 U.L.A. at 376.
315. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)(2) (1977).
316. U.P.A. § 31(2), 6 U.L.A. at 376.
317. U.P.A. § 38(2)(c), 6 U.L.A. at 456-57.
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standing such agreement any member has the power under local
law to dissolve the organization, the organization lacks continuity
of life. Accordingly, a general partnership subject to a statute cor-
responding to the Uniform Partnership Act and a limited part-
nership subject to a statute corresponding to the Uniform Lim-
ited Partnership Act both lack continuity of life.318
This last sentence has been referred to as "the shorthand test" to
determine whether a limited partnership has continuity of life. 19
It appears, however, not to be a test but a flat rule that U.L.P.A.
limited partnerships will never have the corporate characteristic of
continuity of life.
The U.L.P.A. modifies the U.P.A. by making some provision for
partners to draft away a technical dissolution: "The retirement,
death or insanity of a general partner dissolves the partnership,
unless the business is continued by the remaining general partners,
(a) Under a right to do so stated in the certificate, or (b) With the
consent of all the members."3 20 The continuity of life regulations
blatantly, and somewhat ambiguously, track this U.L.P.A. provi-
sion: "If the retirement, death, or insanity of a general partner of a
limited partnership causes a dissolution of the partnership, unless
the remaining general partners agree to continue the partnership
or unless all remaining members agree to continue the partnership,
continuity of life does not exist. '3 21 Does the opportunity to draft
away a technical dissolution under th U.L.P.A., or its exercise,
mean that a U.L.P.A. limited partnership has the corporate char-
acteristic of continuity of life? No, said the Court of Claims in
Zuckman v. United States. 2 First, under the facts before it there
was a sole corporate general partner. If it withdrew, which it had
the power although not the right to do, there would be "no remain-
ing general partners exclusively entitled under the ULPA to con-
tinue the business."323 More basically,
under the rule announced in Glensder Textile Co. v. Commis-
sioner, expressly adopted by the Treasury in its final regulations,
the mere reservation in the limited partnership agreement of a
318. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)(3) (1977).
319. See Zuckman v. United States, 524 F.2d 729, 734 (Ct. Cl. 1975).
320. U.L.P.A. § 20, 6 U.L.A. at 604.
321. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)(1)(1977). See Glensder Textile Co. v. Commissioner, 46
B.T.A. 176, 185 (1942).
322. 524 F.2d at 735.
323. Id.
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power in the remaining general partners to continue the business
on a general partner's withdrawal, constitutes only a "contingent
continuity of existence," insufficient to satisfy the regulation's
corporate standard.32 4
In Larson the Tax Court agreed. It emphasized that the U.L.P.A.
provisions for drafting away dissolution on the "retirement, death
or insanity" of a general partner do not mention the bankruptcy of
a general partner. Thus, the U.P.A. rule would still control and the
partnership would be dissolved on the bankruptcy of the general
partner. The fact that under the Mai-Kai partnership agreement a
new general partner might be chosen to continue the business did
not affect the court's conclusion. The government argued that the
limited partners could anticipate bankruptcy of GHL and elect a
new general partner. The Tax Court felt that
this element does not detract from the hard fact that if GHL be-
came bankrupt while it was the general partner of ... Mai-Kai,
there would at best be a hiatus between the event of bankruptcy
and the entry of a new general partner so that, from a legal point
of view, the old partnerships would have been dissolved. More-
over, at least in the case of Mai-Kai, a vote of 100 percent of the
limited partners was required to elect a new general partner.
Glensder Textile Company held that such contingent continuity
of life did not resemble that of a corporation. [The association
regulations] incorporate this conclusion.2 5
The court recognized that its application of the regulations to the
event of bankruptcy made it unlikely that a limited partnership
will ever have the corporate characteristic of continuity of life, and
suggested the regulations be amended. 26
324. Id. (citations omitted).
325. 66 T.C. at 175 (citations omitted).
326. Because it disposed of the continuity of life issue solely on the ground that bank-
ruptcy would cause the prohibited dissolution, the court did not find it necessary to address
other arguments made by the Service. One was that, under California law, GHL did not
have the power to dissolve. Another was that California's amendments to the U.L.P.A. pro-
visions concerning dissolution were so extensive that the California statute was no longer
"corresponding to" the U.L.P.A. The California amendments anticipated rights in limited
partners to vote to remove or replace general partners, but did not specify that any voting
on their part could prevent dissolution in the event of bankruptcy. See Rev. Rul. 74-320,
1974-2 C.B. 404.
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G. Centralization of Management
The regulations provide that an organization has centralized
management if any person or group has "continuing exclusive au-
thority to make the management decisions necessary to the con-
duct of the business. . . .Thus, the persons who are vested with
such management authority resemble in powers and functions the
directors of a statutory corporation. ' 3 7 Centralization of manage-
ment is more likely to be found in an organization that has many
members than in a smaller organization.328 The persons who have
the continuing exclusive authority need not be members of the or-
ganization and may hold office as a result of periodic selection by
the members or may be self-perpetuating in office .3 9 The regula-
tions state that general partnerships cannot achieve effective con-
centration of management powers "because of the mutual agency
relationship between members."330 Usually, any act within the
scope of partnership business binds all the partners. Even if the
partners agree among themselves to vest management powers in an
exclusive few, the agreement is ineffective against outsiders who
had no notice of it. The following has been described as the regula-
tions' "shorthand test"33' to determine whether a limited partner-
ship has centralized management: "In addition, limited partner-
ships subject to a statute corresponding to the Uniform Limited
Partnership Act, generally do not have centralized management,
but centralized management ordinarily does exist in such a limited
partnership if substantially all the interests in the partnership are
owned by the limited partners."3 2 The Tax Court in Larson said
the purpose of this rule was to distinguish between centralization
of management in the corporate sense and centralization of man-
agement in a limited partnership sense. If a general partner has a
"meaningful proprietary interest," said the court, the corporate
characteristic will not be present; he will be acting in his own in-
terest and "not merely in a representative capacity for a body of
persons having a limited investment and a limited liability." s
The Larson court concluded that there was centralized manage-
327. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c)(1) (1977).
328. Id.
329. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c)(2) (1977).
330. Treas. Reg.§ 301.7701-2(c)(4) (1977).
331. Zuckman, 524 F.2d at 737.
332. Id. (quoting Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c)(4) (1977) (emphasis added)).
333. 66 T.C. at 177. (citation omitted) (emphasis omitted).
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ment because GHL had no meaningful proprietary interest.334 It
said that GHL had failed to prove that its capital interest had any
value in the years in question, and its subordination to the
payback to the limited partners left GHL with no present right to
income during those years. GHL failed to persuade the court that
its right to future profit had present value. Finally, the right of the
limited partners to remove the general partner meant that "GHL's
right to participate in future growth and profits was wholly contin-
gent on satisfactory performance of its management role, and not
at all analogous to the independent proprietary interest of a typi-
cal general partner. ' 3 5 The taxpayers had argued that the power
of removal and control could be given to limited partners under
the U.L.P.A., that California's version of the U.L.P.A. (which
makes specific reference to such a power) 336 is a statute corre-
sponding to the U.L.P.A. and that, accordingly, the "shorthand
test" required a finding that there was no centralized management.
First, the court said the "shorthand test" for centralized manage-
ment says only that U.L.P.A. limited partnerships generally lack
centralized management. Second, and more importantly, it said
that, by reserving the right to remove the general partner, the lim-
ited partners "took themselves out of the basic framework of the
U.L.P.A. and hence out of the shelter of the regulation. '337
H. Limited Liability
The regulations provide that an organization has the corporate
characteristic of limited liability "if under local law there is no
member who is personally liable for the debts of or claims against
the organization. 3 3 8 Personal liability is present if "a creditor of
an organization may seek personal satisfaction from a member of
the organization to the extent that the assets of such organization
334. There is little in the regulations to indicate when the limited partners own "sub-
stantially all" of the interests in the limited partnership. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(b)(2) Ex-
ample (1) (1960), considers only the partners' relative capital contributions to conclude that
substantially all of the interests in the organization are owned by the limited partners. The
limited partners contributed a total of $5,000,000, whereas the three general partners con-
tributed a total of only $300,000 plus their personal liability. While it might be obvious that
$300,000 is a much smaller sum than $5,000,000, it is not so obvious that it is too small to
constitute a "meaningful proprietary interest."
335. 66 T.C. at 178. (footnote omitted).
336. Compare R.U.L.P.A. §§ 302 and 303(b)(5)(v), 6 U.L.A. at 174-75 (1982 Supp.).
337. 66 T.C. at 179.
338. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(d)(1) (1977).
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are insufficient to satisfy the creditor's claim. 3 39 It does not mat-
ter if the member who is personally liable is the beneficiary of an
assumption or indemnification agreement:
A member of the organization who is personally liable for the ob-
ligations of the organization may make an agreement under which
another person, whether or not a member of the organization, as-
sumes such liability or agrees to indemnify such member for any
such liability. However, if under local law the member remains
liable to such creditors notwithstanding such agreement, there ex-
ists personal liability with respect to such member.34
The regulations state a "shorthand test" for the presence of the
corporate characteristic of limited liability:
In the case of a general partnership subject to a statute corre-
sponding to the Uniform Partnership Act, personal liability exists
with respect to each general partner. Similarly, in the case of a
limited partnership subject to a statute corresponding to the Uni-
form Limited Partnership Act, personal liability exists with re-
spect to each general partner, except as provided in subparagraph
(2) of this paragraph.34
Subparagraph (2) establishes a conjunctive test: personal liability
exists with respect to a general partner unless "he has no substan-
tial assets (other than his interest in the partnership) which could
be reached by a creditor of the organization and when he is merely
a 'dummy' acting as the agent of the limited partners. 34  Or, as
the Tax Court put it in Larson, "personal liability exists [with re-
spect to the general partner] if the general partner either has sub-
stantial assets or is not a dummy for the limited partners. 3 43 The
regulations do not give any "net worth" test for substantial assets
of the kind that is contained in Revenue Procedure 72-13, 341 nor do
they indicate when a general partner is a dummy. Because the
elimination of either one of these factors is sufficient to conclude
that personal liability exists with respect to the corporate general
partner, the Larson court was content to conclude that GHL was
no dummy. The limited partners' removal rights did not render
339. Id.
340. Id.
341. Id.
342. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(d)(2) (1977).
343. 66 T.C. at 180.
344. See infra section VII B.
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GHL a dummy; GHL was a moving force in the transaction rather
than a screen to conceal the active involvement of the limited part-
ners. With one minor exception, the persons controlling GHL were
independent of and unrelated to the limited partners.
The regulations appear to say that, whenever there is no per-
sonal liability with respect to the general partner because both
prongs of the conjunctive test are met, there is personal liability
with respect to the limited partners: "Notwithstanding the forma-
tion of the organization as a limited partnership, when the limited
partners act as the principals of such general partner, personal lia-
bility will exist with respect to such limited partners. 3 45 As Judge
Simpson pointed out in his dissent in Larson,3 46 this interpretation
renders the test a nullity; no limited partnership will ever have the
corporate characteristic of limited liability. Or, as put in Zuckman
v. United States:34 7
In short, the regulation draws a tight, albeit opaque, circle by de-
claring that where the general partner of a limited partnership
has no assets, only two alternatives may follow: (1) if it is not a
"dummy", then it is personally liable; or (2) if it is a "dummy",
then the limited partners for whom it acts as agent and who in
turn serve as its principal, are personally liable. In either case, the
limited partnership cannot have limited liability, inasmuch as at
least one of its "members" - whether general or limited - must
at all times bear personal liability.
I. Free Transferability of Interests
The regulations provide that an organization has the corporate
characteristic of free transferability of interests if each member "or
those members owning substantially all of the interests in the or-
ganization have the power, without the consent of other members,
to substitute for themselves in the same organization a person who
is not a member of the organization. 3I The member must be able,
without the consent of other members, to confer upon his substi-
tute all the attributes of his interest in the organization.
Thus, the characteristic of free transferability of interests does
not exist in a case in which each member can, without the consent
345. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(d)(2) (1977).
346. 66 T.C. at 199.
347. 524 F.2d 729, 741 (Ct. CI. 1975) (footnote omitted).
348. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(e)(1) (1977).
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of other members, assign only his right to share in profits but
cannot so assign his rights to participate in the management of
the organization. Furthermore, although the agreement provides
for the transfer of a member's interest, there is no power of sub-
stitution and no free transferability of interest if under local law a
transfer of a member's interest results in the dissolution of the
old organization and the formation of a new organization. 3 9
Under the U.P.A., no person can become a member of a general
partnership without the consent of all the partners. 5 A convey-
ance by a partner of his interest in the partnership does not of
itself dissolve the partnership, nor, as against the other partners in
the absence of agreement, entitle the assignee to interfere in the
management of the partnership or to require any information or
account of partnership transactions or to inspect the partnership
books.3 51 The assignment does entitle the assignee to receive the
profits to which the assigning partner would otherwise be enti-
tled.352 If the assigning partner intends to end the partnership rela-
tion, the partnership is dissolved. s
Under the association regulations, unless "substantially all" of
the interests in the partnership are owned by the limited partners,
the general partner's interest must also be freely transferable in
order for the corporate characteristic to be present. As the
Zuckman court concluded:
In the absence of an agreement to the contrary, a sole general
partner of a limited partnership may assign his interest and sub-
stitute another for himself without the consent of the limited
partners, but such assignment and substitution will result in a
technical dissolution of the partnership unless the right to con-
tinue the business is specifically accorded the substituted general
partner by the limited partnership certificate.' 5"
349. Id.
350. U.P.A. § 18(g), 6 U.L.A. at 213.
351. U.P.A. § 27(1), 6 U.L.A. at 353.
352. Id.
353. U.P.A. § 27, Official Comment, 6 U.L.A. at 353:
[Early] authorities on the whole state that the mere assignment dissolves the part-
nership. Many such assignments, however, are merely by way of collateral security
for a loan, the assigning party in no wise intending to end the partnership rela-
tion. If he neglects his personal relation the other partners may dissolve the part-
nership under section 31 of this act. But the mere fact of assignment without more
should not be said in all cases to be an act of dissolution.
354. 524 F.2d at 743.
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Because there was no such provision in the certificate and the gen-
eral partner had a significant interest, the Zuckman court con-
cluded that free transferability was not present.
In Larson, the Tax Court concluded that "substantially all" of
the interests in the partnership were in the limited partners, so it
considered only the transferability of their interests, and not that
of the general partner.355 Under the U.L.P.A., a limited partner's
interest is assignable, 56 subject to any provisions in the partner-
ship agreement.3 57 The U.L.P.A. distinguishes between an assignee
who becomes a substituted limited partner and one who does not.
A substituted limited partner is an assignee who is admitted to all
the rights of the limited partner who assigned his interest." 8 An
assignee has the right to become a substituted limited partner if all
the members (except the assignor) consent thereto or if the as-
signor is empowered by the certificate to give the assignee that
right.359 An assignee who does not become a substituted limited
partner has no right to require any information or account of the
partnership transactions or to inspect the partnership books; he is
only entitled to receive the share of profits or other compensation
by way of income, or the return of his contribution, to which his
assignor would have been entitled.360
The regulations provide vaguely that if each member can trans-
fer his interest to a nonmember,
only after having offered such interest to the other members at its
fair market value, it will be recognized that a modified form of
free transferability of interests exists. In determining the classifi-
cation of an organization, the presence of this modified corporate
characteristic will be accorded less significance than if such char-
acteristic were present in an unmodified form.3 1
No mention is made of the calculus of "less significance." It would
appear that the only time it would matter would be if two of the
355. 66 T.C. 159 (1976).
356. U.L.P.A. § 19(1), 6 U.L.A. at 603.
357. R.U.L.P.A. resolves any doubt that the partnership agreement may restrict the as-
signability of limited partnership interests. See R.U.L.P.A. § 702 and Commissioners' Com-
ment, 6 U.L.A. at 184 (1982 Supp.).
358. U.L.P.A. § 19(2), 6 U.L.A. at 603.
359. U.L.P.A. § 19(4), 6 U.L.A. at 603. The assignee becomes a substituted limited part-
ner "when the certificate is appropriately amended in accordance with Section 25." U.L.P.A.
§ 19(5), 6 U.L.A. at 603.
360. U.L.P.A. § 19(3), 6 U.L.A. at 603.
361. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(e)(2) (1977).
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other corporate characteristics were present and one was elimi-
nated. The question would be whether a "modified" form of free
transferability would be enough to tip the balance to achieve nu-
merical supremacy. However, given the bizarre definitions of con-
tinuity of life and limited liability, it is hard to conceive of a situa-
tion in which two corporate characteristics other than free
transferability will be found to be present.
The Zuckman court stated that "the existence of a mere formal
or nominal condition will not prevent [a] member's interest from
being freely transferable within the meaning of the regulation,"3612
and the Larson court agreed. The partnership agreements in Lar-
son permitted the assignment of a limited partner's income inter-
est with the consent of the general partner, which consent could
not be withheld unreasonably.
The requirement of consent, circumscribed by a standard of rea-
sonableness, is not such a restriction on transfer as is typical of
partnership agreements; nor is it the sort referred to by the regu-
lations. In our opinion, the limited partners' income rights were
freely transferable.
[Taxpayers] also argue that transferability is limited by the re-
quirement that, in the event of a proposed assignment, a limited
partner's capital interest first be offered to other members under
certain circumstances. While an assignment for less than fair
market value could be prevented in this manner, there was no
requirement that such an offer be made if an interest was to be
sold to a third party at fair value. Thus, there was no "effort on
the part of the parties to select their business associates," as is
characteristic of the usual partnership arrangement. We think
that these interests possessed considerably more than the "modi-
fied" form of free transferability referred to in subparagraph (2)
of the regulation.3 3
In short, the restrictions on an assignee for fair consideration be-
coming a substituted limited partner "were procedural rather than
substantive," 4 and the corporate characteristic of free transfera-
bility was present.
362. 524 F.2d at 743.
363. 66 T.C. at 183 (citations omitted).
364. Id.
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J. Other Factors
Because Zuckman concluded that none of the four corporate
characteristics, as defined in the regulations, was present, it found
it unnecessary to identify "other factors" that might be relevant to
the issue of the tax classification of limited partnerships. In Lar-
son, on the other hand, the court found a two-to-two split on the
four major characteristics: centralized management and free trans-
ferability of interests were present; but continuity of life and lim-
ited liability were absent. The court stood by the "numerical
supremacy" test in the regulations that condition corporate classi-
fication on the presence of more corporate than noncorporate char-
acteristics. The Service urged the court to find "other factors" to
break the tie and conclude the organizations had more corporate
characteristics than not. The court refused to find "other factors"
that were significant one way or the other, noting the importance
of predictability in applying the classification regulations." 5 When
the Service finally acquiesced in Larson, it listed certain factors
that would not be considered "other factors."
K. Developments in the Wake of Larson
At several points, the opinions in Larson almost begged the
Treasury to amend the classification regulations and eliminate
their extreme bias toward partnership classification. The Treasury
finally issued proposed new regulations with two basic features: (1)
they eliminated the mechanical "numerical supremacy" test; and
(2) they defined the corporate characteristics in more practical,
common-sense ways.366 The extreme bias toward partnership clas-
sification would be over. If adopted, these regulations clearly would
classify certain limited partnerships as corporations for tax pur-
poses. Within a matter of hours, however, the proposed regulations
were withdrawn. 67 The political reaction had been swift and in-
tense.3 6 8 At least in the short run, any basic change in the rules
would have to be made by Congress. In 1978, the Carter adminis-
tration recommended to Congress that limited partnerships be
365. 66 T.C. at 185 n.22: "Indeed, considering the importance of predictability in apply-
ing [the] regulations, we would not be inclined to give such lesser characteristics controlling
weight unless their materiality was unmistakable, a situation which does not obtain in this
case."
366. 42 Fed. Reg. 1038 (1977) (proposed Dec. 30, 1976).
367. 42 Fed. Reg. 1489 (1977) (withdrawn Jan. 6, 1977).
368. Battle is Joined on I.R.S. Partnership - Corporation Ruling, N.Y. Times, Jan. 7,
1977, at All, col. 3.
[Vol. 11:1
STATE AND TAX PARTNERSHIPS
classified as corporations for tax purposes if they have in excess of
fifteen limited partners.369 The proposal got nowhere. At the time
of this writing, there is nothing to suggest that Congress is about to
act to classify limited partnerships as corporations.
1. Acquiescence in Larson, "Other Factors" and the Service's
Position
In light of the withdrawal by the Treasury of its proposed new
classification regulations and continued inaction on the subject by
Congress, the Treasury finally acquiesced in Larson in 1979. In so
doing, it issued Revenue Ruling 79-106,3"" which lists factors that
the Service will not consider as "other factors" that have signifi-
cance (independent of their bearing on the six major corporate
characteristics) in determining the tax classification of limited
partnerships:
(1) The division of limited partnership interests into units or
shares and the promotion and marketing of such interests in a
manner similar to corporate securities,
(2) the managing partner's right or lack of the discretionary
right to retain or distribute profits according to the needs of the
business,
(3) the limited partner's right or lack of the right to vote on
the removal and election of general partners and the right or lack
of the right to vote on the sale of all, or substantially all, of the
assets of the partnership,
(4) the limited partnership interests being represented or not
being represented by certificates,
(5) the limited partnership's observance or lack of observance
of corporate formalities and procedures,
(6) the limited partners being required or not being required
to sign the partnership agreement, and
(7) the limited partnership providing a means of pooling in-
vestments while limiting the liability of some of the
participants.""
The Ruling emphasized that the Larson court did not conclude
that "other factors" are never relevant; it simply failed to find any
significant "other factors" in the facts before it.
In summary, there is a good argument that the present classifica-
369. H.R. 12078, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 244 (1978).
370. 1979-1 C.B. 448.
371. Id.
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tion regulations, as interpreted by Larson, make it impossible for
any U.L.P.A. or Revised Act limited partnership to ever be classi-
fied as a corporation for tax purposes. This conclusion follows from
the numerical supremacy test, from the bizarre definitions given to
the corporate characteristics of continuity of life and limited liabil-
ity, and from the failure of anyone to identify the relevant "other
factors" that would tip the balance toward corporate classification.
Nevertheless, the Service continues to insist that it might be able
to identify "other factors," and continues to condition favorable
rulings of partnership classification on compliance with the condi-
tions of Revenue Procedure 72-13, if there is a sole corporate gen-
eral partner, and on Revenue Procedure 74-17.
2. Regulation Changes After 1980
In October, 1980, the Treasury proposed new regulations to clar-
ify that references in the association regulations "to the ULPA
shall be deemed to refer to that Act both as originally promulgated
and as revised in 1976. Thus, the same classification rules will ap-
ply to entities organized under a statute corresponding to the re-
vised ULPA as apply to entities organized under a statute corre-
sponding to the original ULPA. ' '372 This seems to be a retreat from
the Service's more aggressive, pre-Larson position that state
changes to the U.L.P.A. could seriously jeopardize tax classifica-
tion.3 73 In particular, these proposed regulations discuss the effect
of limited partners' removal rights on the presence or absence of
the corporate characteristic of centralized management:
[11f all or a specified group of the limited partners may remove a
general partner, all the facts and circumstances must be taken
into account in determining whether the partnership possesses
centralized management. A substantially restricted right of the
limited partners to remove the general partner (e.g., in the event
of the general partner's gross negligence, self-dealing, or embez-
zlement) will not itself cause the partnership to possess central-
ized management.3 7 4
372. Prop. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(5), (c)(4), U.S. Tax Cas. Advance Sheets (CCH) 8915
(1981).
373. See Rev. Rul. 74-320, 1974-2 C.B. 404, which discusses an amendment to the Cali-
fornia Uniform Limited Partnership Act.
374. Prop. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(5), (c)(4), U.S. Tax Cas. Advance Sheets (CCH) 8915
(1981).
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This provision addresses the fact that the Revised Act states that a
limited partner does not violate the "control" limitation simply by
voting to remove a general partner. The proposed addition, how-
ever, makes no mention of the effect of the right of removal on the
characteristic of free transferability of interests.
In November of 1980, the Treasury issued a proposed amend-
ment to the association regulations that would make it impossible
for limited liability companies to be classified as partnerships for
tax purposes. A limited liability company is a fairly recently im-
ported form of business organization that insulates all members
from personal liability.-7 5 The proposed regulation, which has had
its effective date repeatedly postponed, provides that "the term
'partnership' can apply only to an organization, some member of
which is personally liable under applicable local law for debts of
the organization."3 76 For purposes of this rule, "only liability aris-
ing solely from membership in the organization shall be taken into
account; liability of a member as a guarantor on an obligation will
be disregarded.31 7 7 Accordingly, limited liability companies are to
be taxed as corporations, not as partnerships. The notice of the
proposed change specifically provides that no change is intended
with respect to limited partnerships:
[E]ntities organized under statutes corresponding to the Uniform
Partnership Act or the Uniform Limited Partnership Act shall
continue to be classified under existing rules since those statutes
make general partners personally liable for partnership debts.
The fact that general partners may make other arrangements to
insure themselves against loss as a result of partnership debts
does not obviate the existence of personal liability under the ap-
plicable law. 78
It is not at all clear how the limited liability company is function-
ally distinguishable from a limited partnership with a nominally
capitalized sole corporate general partner. If and when that be-
comes clear, perhaps some justification will be found for taxing one
375. See, e.g., Ch. 82-177, 1982 Fla. Laws 177; WYo. STAT. § 17-15-101 (1977). See gener-
ally Burke and Sessions, The Wyoming Limited Liability Company: An Alternative to Sub
S and Limited Partnerships?, 50 J. TAX'N 232 (1981).
376. Prop. Reg. § 302.7701-2(a)(2)-(4), U.S. Tax Cas. Advance Sheets (CCH) 8922
(1981). As this article was going to press, the proposed amendment was withdrawn. Ann. 83-
4, supra n.287.
377. Ann. 83-4, supra n.287.
378. Id.
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as a corporation and the other as a partnership.
3. The American Law Institute's Proposals
In March of 1982, the American Law Institute (ALI) approved
its Federal Income Tax Project final draft on Subchapter K. The
years preceding had produced a series of recommendations cover-
ing the entire spectrum of partnership tax issues. The Project's
Proposal 0 would classify virtually all limited partnerships as part-
nerships for tax purposes:
PROPOSAL 0 - PARTNERSHIP CLASSIFICATION
1. GENERAL RULE
A partnership organized and operated under the
Uniform Partnership Act or the Uniform Limited Part-
nership Act, as either act is substantially in effect in
any State, and not publicly traded within the meaning
of Paragraph 2 below, shall be treated as a partnership
for Federal income tax purposes.
2. DEFINITION OF PUBLICLY-TRADED PARTNERSHIPS
An interest in a limited partnership shall be consid-
ered publicly-traded only if at any time in the partner-
ship's existence, interests in the partnership are traded
in an established securities market. 79
Because Proposal 0 avoids "the difficult definitional questions that
must now be considered in classifying a limited partnership," it
promotes "simplicity in the interpretation and administration of
the revenue laws."380 In addition, the drafters felt that there were
several reasons why Proposal 0 "appears to reach an appropriate
result."381
There have apparently been relatively few attempts to impose a
corporate tax on the income of a U.L.P.A. limited partnership."'
The recent tax classification battles have focused on the limited
partnership as a vehicle for passing tax losses through to limited
379. T.D. No. 7, supra note 289, at 109.
380. Id. at 65.
381. Id.
382. In Glensder Textile, 46 B.T.A. 176 (1942), acq. 1942-1 C.B. 8, the government at-
tempted to tax the income of a limited partnership organized under New York's version of
the U.L.P.A. "Although the Service thereafter appears to have pursued the issue against
certain partnership associations organized under laws different from ULPA, there were few
attempts to impose a corporate tax on a ULPA entity." T.D. No. 7, supra note 289, at 67
(citing Giant Auto Parts, Ltd., 13 T.C. 307 (1949), supp. op., 14 T.C. 579 (1950) and Tresas.
Reg. § 301.7701-3(c) (1977)).
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partners. The ALI's recommendation on tax classification must be
viewed in the context of companion ALI proposals for more effec-
tive partnership audits, rules to prevent the pass-through of tax
benefits in certain limited partnerships, and rules requiring loss al-
locations among limited partners to have substantial economic ef-
fect.383 Given these companion proposals directed at inappropriate
loss pass-throughs and allocations, "the remaining question is
whether [the limited partnership] should be subjected on the one
hand to a corporate tax regimen, with its profits taxed directly and
its owners taxed only on distributions or, whether, on the other
hand, its income should be taxed to its owners on a pass-through
basis." 3 4 In short, the companion ALI proposals strip the tax clas-
sification issue of much of its present significance and result in a
tax classification rule that is directed toward the profitable
partnership.
The policy judgment of the ALI: permit freer access to Sub-
chapter K. The basic perception was that the corporate tax system,
with a tax on the entity income followed by a shareholder tax on
dividends and on disposition of stock at a gain, and the pass-
through model of partnerships, are trade-offs: "For entities that
are economically similar to partnerships, a direct tax on the owners
of the entity is considered an adequate substitute for the combined
corporate and shareholder level tax applied to corporations. '"3 85
There are a number of specific examples in which pass-through
taxation has been considered appropriate. Partnerships, of course,
have long been exempted from tax, even though they may have
many members and substantial income. The present regulations,
for example, classify as a partnership an organization that has 900
limited partners. 6 Large and highly profitable law partnerships
may present the most pleasing example to present readership. In
addition, there are extremely large joint ventures between and
among large corporations, such as the nuclear plant in Madison
Gas, which produce sizable income yet are free from any tax at the
entity level. The basic point, again, is that such economically sig-
nificant ventures are permitted to escape entity taxation because a
383. The ALI proposals for partnership level audits bore fruit in TEFRA, Pub. L. No.
97-248, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., which introduced I.R.C. §§ 6221-6231 (1982).
384. T.D. No. 7 supra note 289, at 64.
385. Id. at 85-86. "The converse is also true. There are few inhibitions on selection of a
corporate tax system by incorporation of a business that might otherwise be conducted in
partnership form." Id. at 86 n.*.
386. Tress. Reg. § 301.7701-3(b)(2), Example (2).
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pass-through tax is considered an adequate substitute.8 7 Mutual
funds and real estate investment trusts, which also represent large
amounts of capital, are also exempted from the corporate tax; their
earnings are taxed on a pass-through basis. Many small corpora-
tions are able to minimize or eliminate their taxable income by
paying their shareholders salaries, rent, interest and similar ex-
penses. This effectively removes the tax burden from the corpora-
tion and places it on the shareholders.
The Subchapter S corporation is probably the best illustration of
the continued and increasing willingness of Congress to provide the
option of a pass-through model of taxation. Under Subchapter S,
Congress has for years exempted many small corporations from the
corporate income tax. Instead of a tax at the entity level, the in-
come of a Subchapter S corporation is taxed to its shareholders.
Congress has defined Subchapter S corporations in terms of the
number of shareholders and types of income. Although Congress
initially allowed only ten shareholders, it has made Subchapter S
available to corporations with unlimited income.388 Most recently,
the Subchapter S Revision Act of 1982 increased the permissible
number of shareholders to 35 and made a series of sweeping
changes to the Subchapter S rules.3 8 9 In short, the new Act simpli-
fies and eases the rules for eligibility for Subchapter S status and
makes the rules that govern Subchapter S corporations and their
shareholders more like the partnership rules than ever. This most
recent decision by Congress to ease access to Subchapter S is an
analogy that supports the ALI proposals for freer access to Sub-
chapter K.
387. T.D. No. 7 supra note 289, at 89 n.* "The decade of the '70's saw extensive consid-
eration of integration proposals which could shift some or all of a corporation's tax burden
to its shareholders. For a useful discussion of integration proposals, see McCLuRE, MUST
CORPORATE INCOME BE TAOx TwicE? (Brookings, 1979)."
388. T.D. No. 7 supra note 289, at 87 n.*: "Income limits were probably not placed on
Subchapter S corporations because (1) the number of shareholders was originally limited to
ten and (2) the provision was not generally considered to be beneficial to shareholders in tax
brackets substantially in excess of the then 52 percent corporate rate."
389. Subchapter S Revision Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-354, 96 Stat. 1669 (1982).
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